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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Did you ever wonder if you could identify, segregate and
assign values of importance to the factors that make a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combat ready? Have you
ever tried to identify what combat readiness factor differ-
ences exist between the air f ground and combat service
support elements of a MAGTF? Do you feel that the factors
of readiness included in the joint service Unit Status and
Identity Report (UNITREP) are adequate measures of combat
readiness of a MAGTF?
B. BACKGROUND
As a graduate student working on my thesis, I had the
opportunity to conduct research on these questions. My
interest in this topic began while I was a member of a class
titled Manpower Policy Analysis. The course professor was
Thomas G. Swenson and he recognized that manpower policy
issues of an organization were a function of numerous other
policy issues. Accordingly, the course focused on a total
systems approach of military organizations. One of the
major themes of the course was that of relating "resources
to readiness" and the class was exposed to many issues
pertaining to UNITREP. (Note: The major factors of
12
readiness included in UNITREP are personnel, equipment and
supplies on hand, equipment condition and training.)
The course required class members to organize into small
groups and pick a naval organization to research the factors
of readiness thereof. Subject groups were further required
to present their research results in a paper reflecting a
total systems overview of the organization they studied. I
was a member of a group comprised of three naval surface
line officers and we selected a naval Amphibious Task Force
(ATF) for our analysis.
When my group developed its first ATF readiness model
for analysis we inadvertently included all of the factors
associated with the four pillars of military capability,
i.e., structure, modernization, readiness, and sustain-
ability. When we redeveloped our model we did so with
objectives to: 1) focus on factors relating only to
"readiness" and 2) include only factors that we could
develop recommended measurements for. By default, the major
readiness factors we listed in oar final model related
closely to the readiness factors included in UNITREP. My
group's ATF readiness model included personnel, equipment,
training and command/control as major factors
—
differing
from UNITREP by command/control (ATF model) and equipment
and supplies on hand (UNITREP)
.
In that a MAGTF is a major element of an ATF, I decided
to build upon my group's research of ATF readiness in
13
general and to devote my thesis research solely to combat
readiness of a MAGTF.
My thesis study began by surveying 45 Marine officers at
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) . I wanted their help in
evaluating a MAGTF combat readiness model that I intended to
use for further analysis. I wanted them to tell me what
factors I had listed were considered important in respect to
measuring combat readiness of a MAGTF. Additionally, I
asked their recommendations for additions, deletions or
modifications to the model I proposed. I asked them to
consider being assigned to an appropriate billet of a Marine
Amphibious Brigade (MAB) , that was afloat or an air alert,
when the word came down to "land the landing force" or "fly
away" and what they would want to see, hear and have
available in their unit at that time. Some of the
recommendations they gave me were surprising, yet others
just confirmed concepts I thought were applicable.
Using the input from my initial NPS survey, I developed
an enhanced MAGTF combat readiness model to obtain
additional research data from. I did not desire to conduct
a mail order survey saga and wanted to have as much personal
interaction as possible with my survey participants. Due to
the constraints of time and TAD funds, I needed to select a
geographic region that would allow me efficient access to
officers with air, ground and combat service support
14
experience. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) and the
Marine Corps Development and Education Center (MCDEC)
allowed me such access. In respect to MCDEC I obtained
approval to survey a selected group of officers at the
Command and Staff College (C&SC) and the Amphibious Warfare
School (AWS)
.
The results of my study provides the expert value
judgements of 46 officers at HQMC, C&SC, and AWS. Some of
the individuals I surveyed were the finest from their
occupational fields and others (like myself) were
representative of average Marine officers. Yet, I am
confident that the input they provided is representative of
the major cross-sections in our Marine Corps today.
When I started in search of combat readiness in the U.S
Marine Corps, I was not sure of what I would or should find
along the way. I was cautioned that many important combat
readiness factors were qualitative and could not be
measured. This turned out to be true with respect to some
factors. Yet, my search was a most interesting and
motivating experience. I learned a tremendous amount from
the officers I surveyed and hope that other officers in the
U.S. Marine Corps can benefit from the data I have compiled
15
II. WHAT IS A MAGTF?
A. BASIC ORGANIZATION
Marine forces are task organized into MAGTFs for combat
operations. A MAGTF consists of a command element (CE)
,
ground combat element (GCE) , an aviation combat element
(ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE),











Figure 2.1 Basic Organization of a MAGTF
Three sizes of a MAGTF may be formed: a Marine
amphibious force (MAF) formed around a reinforced infantry
division, a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) formed around a
regimental landing team, or a Marine amphibious unit (MAU)
formed around a battalion landing team.
Similar organizational concepts are embodied in all
three MAGTFs. Readiness factors identified for one sized
MAGTF should also apply to the other MAGTFs.
16
B. CURRENT MAGTF HEADQUARTERS
For background purposes, the U.S. Marine Corps has 13
permanently staffed MAGTF Command Elements shown in Figure
2.2. [Ref. l:p. 5]
West Coast East Coast Western Pacific
I MAF II MAF III MAF
5th MAB 4th MAB 1st Bde
7th MAB 6th MAB 9th MAB
11th MAU 22nd MAU
13th MAU 24th MAU
Figure 2.2 Current U.S. Marine Corps MAGTF Headquarters
17
III. WHAT IS READINESS IN GENERAL
A. SEGREGATING READINESS FROM THE FOUR PILLARS OF MILITARY
CAPABILITY
There are four distinct elements of military capability,
that when combined provide the total force capability of the
U.S. Armed Forces. These four distinct elements are often
referred to as "the four pillars" of military capability
within the Department of Defense (DOD) . They are defined as
follows
:
1) Force Structure - The numbers and types of organized
units, active and reserve, of operating ships (or
crafts) and aircraft, and the facilities of the
supporting base infrastructure.
2) State of Modernization - The level of weapon system
technology reflected in the components of the force
structure
.
3) Readiness - The degree to which the operating units in
the force structure are capable of performing the
tasks for which they were designed and organized.
4) Sustainabili ty - The ability of operating forces to
conduct . . . operations over extended periods.
[Ref. 2:p. 5]
The focus of this study will be on "readiness" and
associated factors as designated by the shaded areas in
Figure 3.1.
B. READINESS DEFINED
Numerous definitions of the term readiness exist within






















Figure 3 Readiness Factors within
of Military Capability
the "Four Pillars"
brevity, the following combined statements capture the focus
on readiness used throughout this study:
Readiness is the ability of forces, units, weapons
systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which
they were designed (including the ability to deploy
and employ without unacceptable delays). It depends
on having the required quantities of equipment in the
hands of the units on a day-to-day basis and on having
the required number of adequately trained people
assigned with the necessary mix of grades and
experience level and to ensure that people and
machines can work together. [Ref. 3:p. 10]
Readiness is essentially a measure of pre-D-Day status
(extending at most into initial combat operations)
while sustainabili ty is a post-D-Day measure. Hence,
we often speak of peace time readiness , but combat
sustainabili ty. [Ref. 4:p. 10]
The first definition includes training (individual and
unit), material, equipment, logistics and personnel all as
part of the readiness concept. The second definition
distinguishes between pre- and post-D-Day measures and
segregates "readiness" as a peacetime level of preparedness
to go into combat.
20
IV. HOW IS U.S. MARINE CORPS READINESS MEASURED?
The U.S. Marine Corps is frequently referred to as this
nation's force in readiness and devotes much attention to
assessing unit combat readiness. Two reports whose specific
objectives are to report unit readiness are UNITREP and the
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)
.
A. MCCRES
MCCRES is designed to assess unique U.S. Marine Corps
air-ground team combat readiness. It was implemented in
July 1978 and is used to test Infantry, Fixed Wing, Rotary
Wing, Aerial Observation, Combat Support and Combat Service
Support units, both regular and reserve.
MCCRES evaluates units in 10 categories and is conducted
in accordance with Marine Corps Order 3501.2, Volumes I-X.
Separate volumes provide instructions on how a MCCRES is
to be conducted for each type of unit. The categories each
unit is evaluated in are as follows:
1) Reporting to higher level of command.
2) Preparing for operations.
3) Communicating (including communications SOP).
4) Performing as Marines (e.g., discipline, dispersion,
camouflage, concealment, using weapons).
5) Delivering supporting fire.
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6) Planning of operations.
7) Conforming to doctrine.
8) Executing operations.
9) Providing combat service support (including medical
support)
.
10) Supervising required actions by individual Marines.
[Ref. 5:p. 7]
The quantitative percentile score of a MCCRES test is
accumulated from "yes/no/not applicable" evaluations as
judged by experienced, expert evaluators. Yet,
Officially, there is no relationship between the
numerical score for the Battalion and the Combat Ready/
Not Combat Ready rating .... One battalion with an
overall numerical score of 50 could be judged Combat
Ready, while another having a numerical score of 75
could be judged Not Combat Ready. [Ref. 6:p. 10]
The prime focus of MCCRES is upon operational combat
readiness and the final grade assigned to a unit is either
"Combat Ready" or "Not Combat Ready". Yet, whether or not a
unit is combat ready can only be determined under actual
combat conditions. Therefore,
The Marine Corps must substitute simulated combat for
actual combat .... Thus, for MCCRES, the Marine
Corps test adherence to doctrine, under simulated
combat conditions as a proxy for the real question.
[Ref. 7:p. 6]
MCCRES was developed due to a need by the Marine Corps
for :
. . . an improved readiness evaluation system to,
provide a timely and accurate evaluation of readiness
of the Fleet Marine Forces, including reserve units,
to accomplish assigned missions. [Ref. 8:p. 5]
22
Unfortunately, due to the constraints of time,
conducting single person research and TAD funds I was unable
to conduct an indepth study of MCCRES. Yet, based upon
discussions with many Marine officers, I perceive that
MCCRES was developed partially as a Marine Corps specific
improvement to the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Force Status
(FORSTAT) systems, which later was modified and renamed
UNITREP. Whether or not UNITREP is an adequate measure of
U.S. Marine Corps combat readiness will be one of the major
focuses in the remainder of this study.
B. UNITREP
UNITREP was implemented in April 1980. All U.S.
military services are required to report required data, via
the appropriate chain, to the JCS in accordance with JCS
Publication 6.
Like MCCRES, each service is required to report on only
combat, combat support, and service selected combat service
support units.
UNITREP requires information only on certain selected
resources controlled by or organic to the reporting unit.
UNITREP does not attempt to evaluate units in regards to
a specific operational plan or mission area.
Within the U.S. Marine Corps, UNITREP reporting origi-















Figure 4.1 U.S.M.C. Flow of UNITREP Reports
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unit level and flows to the JCS via the operational chain
depicted'in Figure 4.1. [Ref. 2:p. 10]
The UNITREP system, applicable to the U.S. Marine Corps,
enables units to report readiness of resource areas
(personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment
condition and training) and of unit "overall" readiness.
UNITREP data is quantified on a nominal scale by means
of combat (C) ratings:
C-l = fully ready
C-2 = substantially ready
C-3 = marginally ready
C-4 = not ready
Even though UNITREP provides a quantified scale for the
measurement of each resource area, the unit commander must
make a judgemental decision of his unit's "overall" combat
rating, i.e., "ready" or "not ready".
Listed below are the major resource areas, their sub-
factors and the quantitative rating scale used to determine
C-ratings within the U.S. Marine Corps [Ref. 8: pp. A15-A16]
(Note: The percentages in parenthesis refer to air units):
C-RATING DETERMINATION
1) PERSONNEL
CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4









strength of critical MOS.
c) Grade fill of military _>85% >75% >_65% <65%
service-selected critical






2) EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND
CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4
>90% >80% >65% <65%
(90%) (80%) (60%) (60%)
a) Total military service-
selected combat-essential
equipment possessed divided
by prescribed wartime require-
ment. Aircraft percentages
in parentheses.
b) Total military service- _>90% >_80% >_65% <65 !
selected end items, support
equipment and supplies
possessed divided by pre-
scribed wartime requirement.
3) EQUIPMENT
CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4
>90% >70% >60% <60%
(>75%) (>65%) (>50%) (<50%)
a) Total military service-
selected combat-essential
equipment possessed and




b) Major service-selected >_90% _>70% ,>60% <60%
end items of equipment





CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4
a) Weeks of training <2 >2<4_ >4<6 >6
requi red.
b) Or, percent of combat _>85% >10% >_55% <55%
ready aircrews.
c) Or, percent of unit _>85% _>70% >_55% <55%
training completed.
Whereas MCCRES focuses upon unit operational combat
readiness, I feel that UNITREP's focus is upon unit resource
combat readiness. Thus, for UNITREP, a unit's combat
readiness rating is a function of its resource level, that
includes training achieved as a resource. A more detailed
examination of the value of UNITREP as a measure of U.S.
Marine Corps combat readiness will be presented in Chapters
VII and VIII. Before that, a general systems view of
UNITREP combat readiness of a MAGTF will be provided.
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V. A GENERAL SYSTEMS VIEW OF COMBAT READINESS
OF A MAGTF
For the concept of combat readiness to have better
meaning, a working definition of organizational combat
readiness would be helpful. Following is a discussion of a
generalized systematic model of MAGTF combat readiness that
addresses MAGTF elements and attributes in respect to the
overall MAGTF (system). [Ref. 10:pp. 12-15]
Definition : As depicted in Figure 2.1 a MAGTF fits well
into a standard characterization of system, i.e., "it is an
assembly of parts or components connected together in an
organized way .... The parts are affected by being in
the system and are changed if they leave it . . . ."
Elements ; "Elements are the components of each
system. System elements can in turn be systems in their own
right . . . ." Coincidently, the subsystems of a MAGTF are
called "elements", i.e., command, air, ground and service
support
.
Inputs and Resources : Each element of a MAGTF is an
"input" to the overall system. Prior to going under the
operational control of a designated MAGTF, each combat
element is required to complete a specified training plan
and be operationally certified in 10 specific categories via
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MCCRES. The "resources" applied to the MAGTF elements
directly relate to their readiness status.
Conversion Process : The major processes by which MAGTF
elements are converted into an air-ground task force are:
-The actual change in operational and administrative
control (OPCON and ADCON) from parent units to
designated MAGTFs.
-The OPCON and ADCON assignments of the MAGTF to Navy
amphibious task forces or other unified command
structures
.
-Joint training of MAGTF elements internally and
externally with other services/allied forces.
-Operational exercises of the MAGTF with other
services/allied forces.
Outputs : The desired outputs of a MAGTF is to obtain a
unit which can shoot, move and communicate independently or
in a joint task force environment, if necessary.
Attributes : The attributes that follow will give
initial emphasis only to the following "quantity-like"
UNITREP measures:
-Personnel: % fill of total manning level, % fill of
critical MOS and % fill of critical E-5 and above
bi llets
.
-Equipment and Supplies (Quantity): % fill of required
equipment and % fill of total required end items, support
equipment and supplies.
-Equipment (Condition): % fill of requried combat-
essential equipment possessed and "combat ready" and %
fill of major end items possessed and "combat ready".
-Training: Weeks of training required or % of combat
ready air crews or % of unit training completed.
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Note: UNITREP allows unit commanders a great deal of
discretion in regards to assigning their "overall" readiness
status due to the existence of many qualitative factors.
The Environment : As mentioned above MAGTFs are designed
to be part of larger joint service task forces. MAGTFs are
dependent upon the Navy for amphibious lift and a variety of
service/support functions. If designated as part of a
RDJTF, air lift support from the Air Force becomes
necessary.
As a point of interest, MAGTFs are routinely under the
OPCON of a Navy amphibious task force, which via a fleet
command is under the OPCON of a geographic unified command,
i.e., CINCPAC, CINCATL, CINCEUR, etc. However, if not
deployed, ADCON is usually retained by the Marine Corps.
The ADCON chain of command is primarily responsible for the
allocation of combat readiness resources (personnel,
equipment/supplies, equipment maintenance, and training).
Thus, an operational MAGTF has to interact with two primary
environmental hierarchical systems. Figures 5.1 and 5.2
are basic examples of such systems.
Goals, Objectives, Pupose and Function : MAGTFs are one
among many options our national leaders have available o
pursue national security and foreign policy objectives.
MAGTFs, as part of NAVAL amphibious task forces, are one of





Figure 5.1 Basic MAGTF OPCON Environment
goals of "peace through strength". MAGTFs give our national
leaders the availability of a combat ready force that can
meet a wide range of contingencies, on short notice, world
wide
.
Components, Programs and Missions : As mentioned
earlier, a MAGTF must be able to coordinate/operate with
many components outside of its boundaries. MAGTFs can be
organized to perform a variety of programs and missions.
The nature of the mission is a key factor this dictates
the units assigned to and the size of a MAGTF. During World
War II, MAF sized forces were primarily used in the Pacific.
In Korea, a MAB was formed to rescue Army forces trapped in
the Pusan perimeter and later was expanded to a MAF for the
Inchon landing. In Vietnam OPCON of Marine forces rested
with III MAF and standby MAUs were frequently off shore at















NOTE: 1. Prior to going CPCON to a MAGTF the SOP is that
subject units will have required personnel,
equipment and unit specific training.
2. Elements of a MAF
.
3. Elements of a MAB.
4. Elements of a MAU
Figure 5.2 Basic ADCON MAGTF Element Environment
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fight numerous brush fires around the world, i.e., MAU sized
Marine units participated in Grenada and Lebanon.
Management, Agents and Decision Makers : Within a MAGTF,
the personnel filling the traditional chain of command
billets will be the "key players", i.e., the element
commanders and their staffs. In regards to this thesis, a
prime focus will be upon commanding officers. However,
specific agencies will need to be recognized due to their
cognizance over the readiness factors of interest, i.e., the
G-l (personnel), G-3 (operations and training) and G-4
(supply and logistics)
.
Structure : Formal structures as depicted above are
engrained in doctrine.
States and Flows : The Marine Corps 13 MAGTF command
elements have two primary states they can be in at a point
in time. They are either deployed under the OPCON of a
Naval Amphibious task force or they are preparing for
deployment
.
MAGTF command elements are permanently staffed. The
normal CONUS tour with a MAGTF staff is two years in which
one would make two six months deployments. The normal
overseas tour with a MAGTF staff (III MAF or 9th MAB) is 12
months
.
However, MAGTF air, ground and service support elements
have three primary states. They can be preparing for
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deployment, be deployed or be recovering from deployment.
The air, ground and service support elements are usually
rotated under the OPCON of a MAGTF for only six months at a
time.
Within the FMF, resources flow to and from units based
upon their deployment status. Units entering a deployment
cycle are routinely given priority in regards to personnel,
equipment and training resources. The goal is for a unit to
peak as it embarks for a deployment with a MAGTF.
Figure 5.3 is provided to summarize the author's general












Figure 5.3 General Systems View of MAGTF Combat Readiness
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VI. MAGTF COMBAT READINESS SURVEY METHODOLOGY
AND MODEL
A. GENERAL CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
Even though formalized combat readiness definitions and
measures exist (JCS Pub. 6, UNITREP, MCCRES, etc.), unit
combat readiness still remains a very abstract and relative
term to many in the U.S. Marine Corps. Every unit has its
own unique idea of what constitutes its combat readiness and
these ideas no doubt vary widely.
In respect to UNITREP's focus on resource readiness, a
working definition of what unit combat readiness is must be
of practical significance to MAGTF command and combat
element commanders. This is due to the fact that resource
dollars and assets are scarce. Thus, in order to lobby for
or allocate resources efficiently in the attainment of
combat readiness, to know the relationship between resources
and readiness would be most helpful.
So, if understanding the resource to readiness relation-
ship is important to MAGTF command and combat element
commanders, it additionally should be understood at all
levels within the MAGTF's OPCON and ADCON organizations.
That is, combat readiness as an objective should be clearly
understood at all levels (vertical and horizontal) if you
want to manage it effectively.
36
If the resource to combat readiness relationship and
objective is not interpreted the same at each level within
the MAGTF, then the information exchange process could be
potentially distorted. Also, the relationship between
resources and readiness could not be shared and continuity
of effort could be hampered.
Based upon the above concepts, this study utilized a
survey methodology based upon a systemic view and a model-
oriented (linear regression) perspective of MAGTF combat
readiness
.
B. BOOTSTRAPPING—A SYSTEMIC VIEW OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PRODUCT
Bootstrapping is a phrase somehow coined from a concept
known as "paramorphic representation of clinical judgement."
Bootstrapping methodology utilizes mathematical models to
"provide a way of describing mental processes which would
otherwise be accessible only through introspection or
electrophysiological techniques" [Ref. ll:p. 130],
Bootstrapping has evolved into a computerized hierarchical
modelling approach and was developed by Professor Paul J.
Hoffman and COGITAN. Bootstrapping was developed and
implemented as
:
A methodology for capturing the intuitions of experts
by computer, expressing them in rather simple algebraic
form and assessing their reliability. Once defined
this way, the derived functions can substitute for the
more subjective and time consuming evaluations of
experts, and can provide a clear and objective
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representation of the value of each facet of a product,
regardless of the level of specificity or generaliza-
tion of the facet. [Ref. 12:p. 6]
The general framework of the Bootstrapping hierarchical
model approach is based upon:
A class of judgement models which we at COGITAN refer
to as hierarchical scoring models. These models
embrace the following features:
1) The partitioning of the attributes of systems into
logical distinct and meaningful concepts.
2) The organization of the concepts into a hierarchical
system, in which the elements of a grouping at any
given level constitute a list of attributes which
define a concept at the next higher level.
3) The quantification of human judgement through
modelling procedures akin to expert systems in AI
.
Our utilization of expertise requires individuals
familiar with the products, with their features, or
with some partitioned subset of features. The
resulting models define each concept at each
given level of the hierarchy as a function of the
values of those elements which comprise the lower-
order subset of information to which the node is
1 inked.
4) Utilization of the complete hierarchical model to
aggregate observable and measurable attributes . . .
and to generate product evaluation scores at each
conceptual level and node of the hierarchy.
In this way, the evaluation model maps specific
features into more meaningful and more generally useful
concepts .... [Ref. 12:pp. 7-8]
The Bootstrap method has two phases: X-Bootstrap which
involves identification of expert decision makers and the
models they use, and V-Bootstrap which involves the
validation of the models by consensus (internal validation)
and/or by traditional empirical means. This study will only
use the X-Bootstrap phase.
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C. X-BOOTSTRAPPING—DEFINED AND APPLIED TO MAGTF COMBAT
READINESS
X-Bootstrapping can be defined as "a method for
explicating a hierarchical model of organizational (system)
effectiveness from organizational experts" [Ref. 13]. The
focus of this study in regards to organizational
effectivenss is that of combat readiness of a MAGTF. This
focus is based upon the following view of MAGTF hierarchical
relationships :
1) MAGTF combat readiness is a function of subsystem
(element) combat readiness;
2) Subsystem (element) effectiveness is a function of
subsystem (element) outcomes;
3) Subsystem (element) outcomes are a function of
composite decision maker (DM) performance;
4) DM performance is a function of DM behaviors;
5) DM behavior is a function of available resources.
[Ref. 14:p. 4]
D. HQMC AND MCCDEC MAGTF COMBAT READINESS SURVEY VIA
BOOTSTRAPPING
1. Background on Survey Model Development
As mentioned in the introductory comments, I was a
member of an NPS group project that conducted research on
the readiness of a Naval Amphibious Task Force. Using
UNITREP factors as a foundation, the readiness model
described in Appendix A was developed.
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At the conclusion of the group project discussed in
Appendix A, I decided to devote my thesis research solely to
combat readiness of a MAGTF. To obtain help in developing a
MAGTF combat readiness model that contained only significant
factors for USMC consideration, a survey of NPS Marine
officers was conducted. Appendices B and C discuss the
development and results of the NPS Marine officer MAGTF
combat readiness survey.
2. Overview of Final Survey Approach and Model
HQMC and MCDEC were selected as final survey sites
for this study because they allowed efficient access to
officers with air, ground and combat service support
experience. In respect to MCDEC, approval was obtained to
survey officers at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
College (C&SC) and Amphibious Warfare School (AWS)
.
This is brought up again, because in addition to
analyzing horizontal differences between the air, ground and
combat service support communities, an additional effort
will be made to analyze vertical differences between levels
of command. That is, the group of senior colonels (seven
surveyed) from HQMC will be used as a proxy for MAGTF
commanders. (Note: An unsuccessful attempt was made to
obtain flag officer survey input.) The group of Lieutenant
Colonels and Majors from C&SC (19 surveyed) will be used as
a proxy for MAGTF combat element commanders. Finally, the
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group of Captains from AWS (20 surveyed) will be used as a
proxy for unit commanders within the MAGTF combat elements.
A total of 46 Marine officers were surveyed.
Information obtained from the model development
processes discussed in Appendices A, B and C was used to
develop a final model to gather data for analysis via
Bootstrap methodology. Appendix D contains the final survey
package used in this study. Page 82 of this survey package
provides general background information for the survey
participants. Pages 83 and 84 provides a basic description
of the combat readiness factors contained in the survey
package. The remaining pages contain combat readiness
profiles for assessment.
The final combat readiness model used for analysis
is depicted as follows:
- MAGTF Combat Readiness is a function of personnel
readiness + equipment and supplies (quantity) readiness
+ equipment condition readiness + training readiness +
command, control, communications (C3) and unit climate
readiness
;
- Personnel Readiness is a function of percent fill of
manning level + percent fill of critical MOS billets +
percent fill of E-5 and above billets + service
experience of key billet holders;
- Equipment and Supplies (Quantity) Readiness is a
function of percent fill of equipment wartime
requirements + percent fill of end item, support
equipment and supplies wartime requirements;
- Equipment Condition Readiness is a function of percent
of required equipment possessed and "combat ready" +
percent of required end items possessed and combat ready
+ modernization of equipment on hand;
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- Training Readiness is a function of individual skills
training + percent of unit training completed + joing
MAGTF element training + MAGTF and Navy training;
- Command, Control/ Communications (C3) and Unit Climate
Readiness is a function of unit morale + unit leadership
+ C + intelligence capabilities + commanding officers
judgement
.
3. Combat Readiness Survey Profiles Explained
As discussed above, the MAGTF combat readiness
survey model developed consists of five major dimensions,
i.e., personnel, equipment and supplies, equipment
condition, training and C plus unit climate. Accordingly,
to obtain statistical significance from the methodology
used, assessments of 21 profiles of each major dimension and
the overall model was obtained. Thus, each survey
participant assessed a total of 126 profiles. (See pages 85
to 131 of Appendix D.)
The numbering scheme of each profile was obtained
from a data set of random numbers generated by a SAS [Ref.
15] program written by Professor Paul Hoffman. Appendix E
contains the random number data set used to develop each
profile and the SAS program that produced it.
For each major combat readiness dimension, the
survey participant was given the following instructions:
- Each profile you see portrays an alternative in terms of
the dimensions or attributes or MAGTF combat readiness
earlier defined.
- Considering just the information you will be shown, what
is your assessment of overall?
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- Rely upon your knowledge and intuition to rate overall
. Use the rating scale that will appear
at the bottom of each profile. Note the descriptions
given as reference for this scale.
The profile format, scale, numbering scheme and
instructions list were derived from a personal computer
Bootstrap package, developed by Professor Paul Hoffman and
COGITON, called EXPERT77. EXPERT77 is marketed by Magic 7
Software. (See Appendix G for additional details.)
At the time this survey was conducted, the EXPERT77
software package was under development and not available for
use. Yet, each individual survey profile developed for
analysis is a close replica of the individual screens
displayed by EXPERT77. The beauty of EXPERT77 is that it
performs the statistical analysis of each dimension's
assessment as you go. Yet,' due to EXPERT77's unavailability
at the time of this survey, the statistical analysis of each
dimension was performed by manually inputting each data set
into a SAS program. Again, the SAS program used for data
analysis was written by Professor Paul Hoffman.
Figure 6.1 is provided in an attempt to graphically
display the concepts presented in this chapter. [Ref. 14:
p. 8]







MAGTF (System) Combat Readiness
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Figure 6.1 MAGTF Systemic View Combined with Model/
Methodology Development
44
VII. HQMC AND MCDEC MAGTF COMBAT READINESS
SURVEY RESULTS
Appendix F contains an overview of the statistical
terms, formulas, SAS programs and aggregate group data sets
used to derive the results in Tables 7.2 to 7.7.
If in concurrence with my thesis advisors, have decided
not to give any personal speculations in regards to the wide
spectrum of interpretations that could be drawn from the
data provided. Each reader will be left to form his or her
own interpretation. The chapter following this will only
list factual or statistical conclusions.
To prevent the reader from becoming lost in a maze of
numbers, data on individual survey participants is omitted.
What is provided, is aggregate group statistics from the
following aggregate groups (see Table 7.1):
- Ground Colonels (GNDCOL) , four surveyed.
- Air Colonels (AIRCOL) , two surveyed.
- Combat Service Support Colonel (CSSCOL) , one surveyed.
- Ground Field Grade (GNDFG) , ten surveyed.
- Air Field Grade (AIRFG), five surveyed.
- Combat Service Support Field Grade (CSSFG), four
surveyed
.
- Ground Company Grade (GNDCG) , ten surveyed.
- Air Company Grade (AIRCG), five surveyed.
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TABLE 7.1












GNDCOL 4 06 25 1 4
AIRCOL 2 06 24.5 2 2
CSSCOL 1 06 27 1
GNDFG 10 04.6 16.8 1
AIRFG 5 04.6 16.4
CSSFG 4 04 11.75
GNDCG 10 03 7.3
AIRCG 5 03 7.6
CSSCG 5 03 10
TOTAL 46 04.0 7 16.26 19
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- Combat Service Support Company Grade (CSSCG) , five
surveyed.
- NOTE: Total surveyed equals 46.
In the tables that follow the combat readiness factors
are listed vertically, by degree of importance, within each
group referred to above. The number below each factor is the
normalized weight value (see Appendix F) that was derived by
the group. The normalized weight values were rounded to two
digits. The toal of each group's normalized weight values
should equal one. Yet, due to rounding to two digits, some
totals will vary slightly.
The factors assessed were abbreviated as follows:
Overall Factors (Table 7.2):
- Personnel = PERS
- Equipment and Supplies = E+S
- Equipment Condition = EC
- Training = TNG
- Command, Control, Communications (C3) and
Climate = C4
Personnel Factors (Table 7.3):
- % Manning Level = ML
- % Critical MOS = CMOS
- % E-5's and Above = > E-5
- Service and Experience = 3EXP
Equipment and Supplies Factors (Table 7.4):
- % Equipment = EQUIP
- % Supplies = SUP
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Equipment Condition Factors (Table 7.5):
- % Equipment Combat Ready = EQUIP
- % End Items Combat Ready = EI
Training Factors (Table 7.6):
- Individual Skills Training = INDIV
- % Unit Training Completed = UNIT
- Joint MAGTF Element Training = MAGTF
- Joint MAGTF/Navy Training = NAVY
C4 Factors (Table 7.7):
- Unit Morale = MORALE
- Unit Leadership = LDRSHP
- Command, Control and Communications = C3
- Intelligence Capabilities = INTEL
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VIII. MAGTF COMBAT READINESS SURVEY CONCLUSIONS
AND SELECTED COMMENTS
A. REVIEW OF INITIAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
First, let's recall what the initial research questions
of this study were:
1. Question One
Can the factors that make a MAGTF combat ready be
identified, segregated and assigned values of importance?
2. Question Two
What combat readiness factor differences exist
between the air, ground and combat service support elements
of a MAGTF?
3. Question Three
Are the factors of readiness included in UNITREP
adequate measures of combat readiness of a MAGTF?
B. COMMENTS IN REGARDS TO THE INITIAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Question One
(a) By using a combination of brainstorming, delphi,
survey and bootstrapping techniques (Appendices A to
C) with expert judges; MAGTF combat readiness factors
can be identified as indicated in Appendix D.
(b) By using Bootstrap survey methodology, MAGTF combat •*
readiness factors can be segregated and assigned
values of importance as indicated in Tables 7.2 to
7.7.
(c) A better segregation and statistical assessment of the
factors in Tables 7.2 to 7.7 could have been
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accomplished if larger samples of each group could
have been obtained. Yet, to personally administer a
survey the size of Appendix D to larger groups and to
manually extract the data for analysis thereof:
(1) would require more time than allowed for this
thesis, or
(2) would require the efforts of more than one person
who was familiar with the techniques used.
(d) The use of a EXPERT77 personal computer software
package could facilitate:
(1) a savings in time, both in data collection and
analysis, for any research team conducting a
similar research project.
(2) an immediate feedback to survey respondents
regarding their assessment of similar models.
(e) Bootstrap methodology can be used to obtain
quantitative values, of qualitative value judgements,
for a variety of other topics, i.e., performance
evaluation factors, MIS decision support systems
factors, etc.
2. Question Two
In regards to the value judgements of those
surveyed :
(a) More similarities, versus differences, existed with
respect to the combat readiness factors provided for
assessment
.
(b) With respect to the overall model factors (Table 7.2):
(1) Personnel was the dominant factor, that is, seven
out of nine groups ranked personnel either as
first or second in importance.
(2) C4 was the second most dominant factor, that is,
five out of nine groups ranked C4 either as first
or second in importance.
(3) No other overall factor was ranked as either first
or second by more than five groups.
(4) Equipment condition was the least important
factor, that is, all groups ranked equipment
condition as either last or next to last.
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(c) With respect to personnel model factors (Table 7.3):
(1) Percent manning level was the dominant factor,
that is, all groups ranked percent manning level
as either first or second in importance.
(2) Percent E-5's and above was the least important
factor, that is, all groups ranked this factor
either as last or next to last.
(3) The assessments of service experience and percent
critical MOS factors received mixed results.
(d) With respect to equipment and supplies factors
(Table 7.4)
:
(1) All groups ranked percent equipment greater than
percent supplies by an approximate ratio of 6
to 4.
(e) With respect to equipment condition factors
(Table 7.5) : •
(1) All groups ranked percent equipment combat ready
first, percent end items combat ready second and
modernization third.
(2) Even though modernization was ranked last by all
groups, the company grade officer groups assigned
it a higher value than the other two groups.
(f) With respect to training factors (Table 7.6):
(1) All groups ranked individual skills training first
and percent unit training completed second. Seven
out of nine groups ranked joint MAGTF element
training third and Navy/MAGTF training fourth.
(g) With respect to C4 factors (Table 7.7):
(1) Mixed results occurred between the three rank
groups. Yet, due to their different billet
perspectives, this should not be surprising.
(2) Five out of seven colonels ranked morale first.
Yet, the two air colonels ranked C3 first and the
other five ranked C3 second. So, morale and C3
appear to be the dominant factors among the
colonels surveyed.
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(3) All colonels assessed commanding officer's
judgement as third.
(4) Unit leadership was ranked fourth by the ground
and combat service support colonels, yet second by
the air colonels.
(5) All colonels ranked intelligence capabilities as
least important.
(6) All field grade officers ranked commanding
officer's judgement as first, morale as second and
leadership as third.
(7) Ground and combat service support field grade
officers ranked C3 third and intelligence
capabilities last. Just the opposite for the air
field grade officers.
(8) Ground and combat service support company grade
officers all ranked unit leadership first,
commanding officer's judgement second, morale
third, C3 fourth and intelligence, again, last.
(9) The air company grade officers ranking of
intelligence as first is an interesting ranking,
in lieu that all other groups ranked intelligence
last
.
(h) The models provided for assessment in Tables 7.4 to
7.6 were not very good in regards to providing
significant factor differences to choose from. Yet,
these models highlight how Bootstrapping can segregate
and assign values of importance.
(i) The model in Table 7.7 is an indication of how
Bootstrapping can highlight different value judgements
possessed by decision makers at different levels
within a hierarchical organization.
3 . Question Three
I feel that the factors of readiness in UNITREP are
adequate measures of "resource" combat readiness of MAGTF
units. This belief is contingent upon a unit reporting
UNITREP data in a timely and accurate manner. (Note: the
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issue of UNITREP data manipulation by unit personnel and
higher echelons is beyond the scope of this study.)
Yet, a unit could have a high "resource" readiness
rating and still need to be "operationally" certified. This
is where MCCRES comes into play.
For example, a unit with a high "resource" readiness
rating (UNITREP) could be found not "operationally" combat
ready via MCCRES, and visa versus.
Thus, the "overall" combat readiness rating of a
MAGTF unit is contingent upon a combination of UNITREP,
MCCRES, and other informational data determined necessary at
the MAGTF or higher headquarters level.
To conclude my thoughts on UNITREP data, it can
facilitate MAGTF "resource" combat readiness as:
- a media for "resource" readiness briefings,
- a source of information on unit resource status before a
peacetime MAGTF deployment, and
- an indicator of the potential need to reallocate
resources among MAGTF units. [Ref. 2:p. 9]
- There are many ways in which the data in Tables 7.2 to
7.7 could be manipulated for further analysis. One of
these ways can be found in Appendix H.
C. SELECTED COMMENTS OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
I would like to share with you some selected comments of
the officers surveyed. I've included both positive and
negative comments. The comments will be listed under the
appropriate model category, i.e., overall, personnel,
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training, etc. Minor editing of subject comments was made
for clarity and to ensure confidentiality of the officer
concerned. Comments are included from HQMC, MCDEC and NPS
officers surveyed.
1. Overall
- UNITREP does not , in any manner, measure combat
readiness in a MAGTF. Readiness should be measured in
terms of capabilities vis-a-vis requirements (Colonel,
9906) .
- Interesting idea, but it took me a long time to maintain
the survey factor definitions in my head. I had to
review the definitions provided several times
(Lieutenant Colonel, 0302).
- This model was too complicated, administratively busy
and difficult to focus on. I don't know what it is,
yet there has got to be a better way (Major, 0302).
(Note: I agree. EXPERT77 may be the answer.)
- I disagree with the validity of this survey. I do not
feel that the categories of this survey appropriately
judge combat readiness (Major, 0302).
Good model. Please send me
(Captain, 0302)
.
a copy of the results
From my limited knowledge of UNITREP, it seems that
the Marine Corps does not use it as they should.
UNITREP has become a report on the commander--f rom the
commander . . . (Captain, 7538).
The only real tangible feeling for combat readiness is
MCCRES (Captain, 7562).
UNITREP is inadequate. The system as is, is often
abused. Reporting units often inflate or reduce figures
to affect an unrelated decision or to bring attention to
particular problems. Higher headquarters often attempt
to coerce reporting units into changing figures ... or
ignores trends until C-3 or C-4 is reached . . .
(Captain, 0302)
.
UNITREP reporting does a reasonable job of controlling
the flow of men and resources (Major, 0302).
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- The problem with UNITREP is integrity of reporting . . .
we have a significant problem in reporting honestly, any
case of degraded readiness .... Those units with
problems must find it acceptable to report it the way it
is, without the CO. being fired, if there are valid
shortfalls (Major, 7562).
- Suggest you survey rifle battalion and regimental FMF
commanders. NPS officers are not qualified to answer
these questions (Major, 0302). (Note: I concur with
part one only—see recommendations for further study.)
- To me, all the factors you listed are important and the
importance varies only by a degree (Captain, 0180).
- The list seems very complete. A factor I would add is
"how long have the Marines that you are taking into
battle been in their present units?" Did you get them
as you stepped on the boat or did you train them
yourself (Captain, 0302)?
- To me, the levels of personnel and equipment readiness
go hand and glove .... Whether a C-l status in all
areas would be required depends upon what the mission
would be ... . I feel the quantitative measures of
UNITREP are good measures of combat readiness . . . but
many qualitative measures are also very important and
not reflected to the degree they should or could be,
i.e., quality of small unit training, strengths of the
CO., continuity of the unit, morale, etc. (Captain,
3002) .
2. Personnel
- Perhaps another personnel factor should be added, i.e.,
"service experience in MOS." Many Marines who have an
MOS on paper have served in other billet MOS's more than
in their primary MOS (Captain, 0302).
- Another personnel factor is needed, i.e., "unit
stability (turnover rate)" (Captain, 0402).
- It is more important to have good people as opposed to
numbers of people (Captain, 0802).
-
. . . experienced technicians are critical when you are
in a fixed wing unit (Captain, 7588).
- Add under personnel, "identification and training of




3. Equipment and Supplies
- Any commander would want every possible means of support
and supply available for combat. Regardless, the key to
success in combat is built on what you do with your
resources . . . this is entirely a matter of control
(Major, 0302).
. . . the deficiency most often noted by MAU and MAB
commanders/ when deploying, was a lack of equipment
(both quantity and quality). The
was "don't worry, we will get you
you have to go to war." Yet, the
explained (Captain, 0302).
MAF and FSSG answer
the equipment before
how was never
. . . spare parts and an intermediate repair facility
are critical when you are in a fixed wing unit . . .
(Captain, 7588).
If a unit is on its own for 15 days, this would be a
come as you are affair. Any resupply would be air drop
or fly away. In other words, the unit would have to get
in, kick ass and get out (LCDR, USN, Medical Service
Corps)
.
Add under supplies, "identification of replacement
equipment and supplies" and "recent validation of
equipment and supply items to scenarios likely to be
encountered" (tie into intelligence) (LT, USN, Medical
Service Corps)
.
4 . Equipment Condition
Training on existing systems and equipment is more
important than modernization . . . people need to work
with their equipment and maintain it better (Major,
2502) .
I would rather go into the field with older, proven
equipment that more people have more experience with
than a bunch of new crap that is going to break and be
difficult to fix (Lieutenant Colonel, 7562).
Under the present system of-aviation supply support of
MAU operations, an aviation unit would be hard pressed
to maintain OP-ready aircraft during a 15 day
deployment without some link to a snip's maintenance and
supply activities. The result is a squadron is unable
to operate independently of its support vessel and
requires the ship to remain in close proximity of the
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battlefield. This has been found to be a weak link in
attempting extended MAU operations ashore (Captain,
3060)
.
Equipment should not be antiquated, i.e., tubes in a
transistor world, but proficiency with what we have is
criticial (Captain, 2502).
5. Training
With respect to training--a unit is only as good as its
weakest link. If your individual Marines don't have
confidence in their ability to fight, based upon their
individual combat skills, then leadership will not be
able to overcome this deficiency (Lieutenant Colonel,
0302) .
Specification of unit training scenario is needed to
improve this model, i.e., company operations are more
difficult in Panama or Germany, than at Camp Lejeune,
N.C. At Camp Lejeune the Marines are more aware of the
terrain (Captain, 0302).
The worst problem we had at my unit was the absolute
lack of individual, crew or platoon training. We were
CGed and IGed to death. As far as senior officers went,
their emphasis was on dog and pony shows or anything
else political as opposed to training. I hope and pray
that when you get to HQMC, that you will help get
everyone oriented to doing individual and small unit
training. Also, tell them to stop sending politicians
to Camp . Send them to Quantico, in that they
have no business interrupting training in the FMF
(Captain, 1802).
If I had to pick a top priority of the factors listed,
it would be training (Captain, 0302).
In regards to training, all future contingencies will be
in a joint arena. This training cannot be
overemphasized (Captain, 0402)!
6. C_4
Leadership "style" is far less important than the
"quality" of leadership in terms of getting the job done
(Colonel, 9907).
Combining C3 with climate is not logical (Colonel,
9906). (Note: In hindsight, I concur.)
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Commanding officers who possess poor judgement should
not be there to begin with (Lieutenant Colonel, 7511)!
. . . going into combat by order of priorities: 1) self
control, 2) familiarity with chain of command, 3) best
intelligence possible, 4) best equipment possible, and
5) best training for individuals/units possible (Major,
0302) .
I would additionally consider the capabilities and
experience of middle management (i.e., Captains, Majors,
SNCO's, NCO's, etc.) to be of prime importance. With
good and strong middle management a lot of CO.
shortcomings can be overcome (Lieutenant Colonel, 7562).
On C.O.'s judgement— too many items are micro-managed
today, to the extent that the CO. has become only a
messenger. In Lebanon, the JCS was calling once a day
giving "advice" and orders. Maybe this was just a
unique situation (Major, 7564).
Commanding Officer's judgement--a crystal ball--
subjective at best (Captain, 3002).
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Listed below are some of thoughts on the conduct of this
study and suggestions for further research:
A. SURVEY SAMPLING
Any follow-on of this study, or a similar project,
should include input from the Staff Noncommissioned officer
and Noncommissioned officer communities. The experience and
opinions of this superb group of individuals are most
valuable to our Corps.
Any follow-on of this study, or a similar project,
should include input from personnel currently serving in
MAFs, MABs, MAUs or FMF units.
B. READINESS DIMENSIONS USED
An expanded analysis of readiness via Bootstrapping
could be a rewarding and interesting project. For example,
Readiness as a function of resources (UNITREP) + operational
capabilities (MCRESS) + other factors, could provide a more
complete analysis of readiness of a MAGTF.
C. ME.THODOLOGY
Any individual or group considering the conduct of a
simliar project should consider using the EXPERT77 software
package. That is, most people I have observed using
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EXPERT77 have enjoyed their interaction with this software
package. As mentioned earlier, EXPERT77 can facilitate a
considerable savings of time for anyone conducting a like
research project. That is, the data collection and
statistical analysis phase could be self-contained in this
unique product.
EXPERT77 (or manual Bootstrapping) can assist any
organization in the development of criteria of any kind.
D. BOOTSTRAPPING APPLICATIONS
Bootstrapping can be applied to:
- Help organizations better understand their purpose(s).
- Development of generalized systematic modeling of
organization effectiveness.
- Obtaining a strategic understanding of effectiveness.
- Consensus generation
- Development of management information systems to support
control systems.
- Guide analysts in the design of research on resources to
readiness
.
- Develop productivity measurements in respect to the
importance of results divided by resources.
- Orientation and training of critical factors of
success
.
Anytime an organization devotes time to answering the
question what is "effectiveness"?, is time well spent. The
application of Bootstrap in the pursuit of "effectiveness"
offers considerable potential for organizations interested
in explicating effectiveness.
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In that pursuit of effectiveness is an on-going part of
an organization, Bootstrapping can be used to identify
changes occurring due to environmental considerations.
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APPENDIX A
INITIAL READINESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS—
A
MAGTF WITHIN AN ATF
In that a NPS group project model used to evaluate
Amphibious Task Force readiness was the foundation from
which this study's final model was developed, it will be
briefly explained. The ATF group was composed of three Navy
surface line officers (all with amphibious squadron
experience) and myself (who had experienced two sea
deployments). My group's final ATF model was developed with
objectives to: 1) focus on matters relating only to
"readiness" and 2) include only factors that recommended
measurements could be developed for. At the outset of our
ATF readiness model development, the group's consensus was
that UNITREP was an inadequate measure of ATF readiness.
Yet, by default our ATF readiness model (developed by
brainstorming and a modified Delphi process [Ref. 16]
related closely to the readiness factors in UNITREP. My
group's ATF readiness model, of which a MAGTF is a major
element thereof, included personnel, equipment, training and
command/control as major factors
—
differing from UNITREP by




My group's final model is depicted as follows:
- ATF Readiness = Personnel readiness + equipment
readiness + training readiness + command/control
readiness;
- Personnel Readiness = % manning level of personnel on
hand + the experience level of personnel on hand +
command climate (morale);
- Equipment Readiness = Material condition + material
level + modernization + ship type + ship to shore
capabilities ;
- Training Readiness = Navy unit training + Marine unit
training + joint Navy/Marine exercise training;
- Command/Control Readiness = Communication readiness +
intelligence readiness + Navy/Marine coordination
readiness + scenario.
By using a personal computer software package (based
upon Bootstrap methodology) developed by COGITON called
EXPERT77 (See Appendix G) the values of importance of the























- Navy/Marine Coordinates .3000
- Intelligence .1925



















- Marine Unit Training






1) The above ATF readiness factors are listed in sequence
of the group's average value of importance.
2) The group's average value is the normalized weight of
the group's overall value judgements.
3) See Appendix F for computational explanations of the
group's normalized weight and R square value.
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APPENDIX B
NPS MAGTF COMBAT READINESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT
AND RESULTS
At the conclusion of the group project referred to in
Appendix A, I in conjunction with my thesis advsiors,
decided: 1) to use Bootstrapping methodology to further
investigate only MAGTF combat readiness and 2) to gain
approval to survey selected officers at HQMC and MCDEC.
Subject commands were selected as survey sites because they
allowed efficient access to officers with air, ground and
combat service support experience. In respect to MCDEC,
approval was obtained to survey officers at the U.S. Marine
Corps Command and Staff College (C&SC) and Amphibious
Warfare School (AWS)
.
Yet, before heading off to HQMC, I desired to build a
MAGTF combat readiness model that contained the value
judgements of as many Marine officers as possible.
Accordingly, the survey package contained in Appendix C was
developed. Subject survey was sent to 89 Marine officers at
NPS and 45 surveys were completed and returned. (Note: two
of the 45 surveys were completed by Navy Medical Service
Corps officers with each having over 10 years of duty with
the Marine Corps.)
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No fancy or complicated statistical method was used to
compile the results of this survey. My intention was only
to seek recommendations for additions, deletions or
modifications to the model I had developed.
The responses provided for the MAGTF combat readiness





Somewhat Important SI 1
Important I 2
Very Important VI 3
My goal in this survey was to be able to go to HQMC and
MCDEC with a MAGTF combat readiness model that included only
important factors for consideration. By computing group
averages of the individual responses to the 45 surveys
completed I was able to achieve this goal. The maximum
average value of any factor was 3 (VI). I made an arbitrary
decision that for a factor to be included in the final
survey model, it would need an average group response of
1.75. That is, I wanted all factors to be close to or
greater than a group average of 2 (I). Listed below are the
results of the NPS MAGTF model survey:
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Personnel Factors Average Value
- % of Critical MOSs 2.82
- % >_ E-5 Billets 2.70
- Experience Level 2.56
- % Manning Level 2.56
- Combat Experience 1.64
Equipment and Supplies
- % Equipment 2.82
- % Supplies 2.79
Equipment Conditions
- % Equipment Combat Ready 2.97
- % End Items Combat Ready 2.61
- Modernization 1.91
Training
- Joint Air, Ground and
Combat Service Support 2.59
- Individual Skills 2.56
- % Combat Ready Air Crews 2.47
- % Unit Training Completed 2.41
- Weeks Training Required 2.25
- USMC/Navy Training 2.24
Other
- Command, Control and
Communication 2.80
- Intelligence 2.76
- CO ' s Judgement 2.66
- Command Climate 2.59
- CO's Leadership 1.91
NOTES:
1) The values for each factor are simply the average
value of 45 NPS officer respondents, with a maximum
value possible of 3.
2) Factors are listed in sequence of high to low average
value within each major category.
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3) No computations were obtained for the overall values,
i.e., personnel equipment and supplies (quantity),
equipment condition, training and other.
Based upon the numeric averages listed above and upon
recommended modifications from the NPS officer respondents,
I made the following modifications to the subject model:
- Having personnel with combat experience was deleted due
to its low group average value and comments relating
that having such personnel would not be likely at th
MAGTF combat element level.
- In regards to unit training factors, only "percent unit
training completed" was retained in that it could be
more easily related to each major element of a MAGTF.
This was an error in judgement by the author, in that
subsequent research revealed that "weeks of training" is
the primary criteria used in reporting USMC UNITREP
training data.
- "Command climate" was redesignated to "unit morale".
- "Commanding officer's leadership style" was expanded to
that of "unit leadership".
Basic information on the NPS officers who provided input






(*) = One Navy Medical Service Corps Officer, both of
whom had combat tours with the Marines in Vietnam.
Air G round CSS Total
1 1
3 4 5(*) 12
9 12 8(*) 29
2 1 3
13 18 14 45
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APPENDIX C
NPS MAGTF COMBAT READINESS SURVEY
This appendix contains the survey package that was
conducted at the NPS from 19 August until 6 September 1985
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19 August 1985
From: Major Paul R. Stahl
To: Fellow Naval Postgraduate School Marine
Subj : Thesis Help and Advice, request for
Encl: (1) MAGTF Combat Readiness Questionnaire
1. Can the factors that make a Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) combat ready be segregated and assigned values
of importance? Do the factors that make the elements of
MAGTF combat ready differ by type of element, i. e. ground,
air and combat service support? Are the factors of
readiness in UNIREP adequate measures of combat readiness of
a MAGTF? These questions represent the general thrust of the
research I have chosen for my graduate thesis. The purpose
of this letter is to introduce myself and request your
assistance
.
2. I am a student in the Manpower, Personnel and Training
Analysis Curriculum. After graduation I am slated for duty
with the Plans and Policy Division, Manpower Department,
HQMC. My thesis topic is "In Search of Combat Readiness in
the U. S. Marine Corps." The enclosure is provided to obtain
your expert opinion on my topic.
3. Consider yourself assigned to an appropriate billet of
a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). You are either afloat or
in an alpha air alert status. Our national leaders have
determined it necessary to project power ashore in a hostile
region. The word has come down to "land the landing force"
or "fly away". You know that your unit could be on its own
for up to 15 days possibly. What would you want to see, hear
or have available in your unit at this time? The combat
readiness ratings of your unit prior to the above situation
could be a factor in regards to the resources available to
your unit
.
5. With the above thoughts in mind please complete the
enclosure and return to me in the envelope provided. For






MAGTF COMBAT READINESS QUESTIONNAIRE





Modify As Indicated MOD
Personnel :
-Percent fill of manning level?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent fill of critical MOSs?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent fill of critical E-5 and above billets?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Experience level of personnel on-hand?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Having personnel with combat experience on-hand?
NI SI I VI MOD
Equipment and Supplies ( Quanity )
:
-Percent fill of required equipment?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent fill of required end items, support equipment
and supplies?
NI SI I VI MOD
Equipment ( quality )
:
-Percent fill of combat - essent ial equipment possessed and
combat ready?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent fill of major end items possessed and combat
ready?
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NI SI I VI MOD
-Modernization of equipment on-hand?
NI SI I VI MOD
Training :
-Weeks of Training required?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent of combat-ready air crews?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Percent of unit training completed?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Individual skills training?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Joint air, ground and service support training?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Joint USMC MAGTF and Navy Training?
NI SI I VI MOD
Other :
-Command climate (to include morale)?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Commanding officer's judgement abilities?
NI SI I VI MOD
-Commanding officer's leadership style?
NI SI I VI MOD
-MAGTF command, communications and control capabilities?
NI SI I VI MOD
-MAGTF intelligence capabilities?
NI SI I VI MOD








My experience has primarily been with with the following
types of units (circle one please):
Air Ground Serv/Spt Other (Please state)
I have primarily served on (circle one please):
East coast West coast
Overseas (If so where?)
Other (Please state)
Any other comments you would like to make:
79
APPENDIX D
HQMC AND MCDEC MAGTF COMBAT READINESS
SURVEY VIA BOOTSTRAPPING
This appendix contains the survey package administered




"IN SEARCH OF COMBAT READINESS IN THE U. S. MARINE CORPS'
A LOOK AT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTORS THAT MAKE
A MARINE CORPS AIR- GROUND TASK FORCE COMBAT READY
Major Paul R. Stahl, USMC






BACKGROUND AND GENERAL INFORMATION
Can the factors that make a Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) combat ready be segregated and assigned values of
importance? Do the factors that make the elements of MAGTF
combat ready differ by type of element, i. e. ground, air
and combat service support? Are the factors of readiness in
UNITREP adequate measures of combat readiness of a MAGTF?
These questions represent the general thrust of the research
I have chosen for my graduate thesis. The purpose of this
survey is to request your expert opinions.
Please do not panic at the size of this survey package.
The combat readiness model developed for your analysis was
derived from a survey of 40 Marine officers at the Naval
Postgraduate School. It consists of five major combat
readiness dimensions. To obtain statistical significance
from the methodology I will use for my analysis, data from
21 profiles of each major dimension is required. Due to
paper size constraints, each page of this survey contains
only one, three or four profiles as appropriate.
Consider yourself assigned to an appropriate billet of a
Marine Amphibious Brigade. You are either afloat or in an
alpha air alert status. Our national leaders have determined
it necessary to project power ashore in a hostile region.
The word has come down to "land the landing force" or "fly
away". You know that your unit could be on its own for up to
15 days possibly. What would you want to see, hear or have
available in your unit at this time? The combat readiness
ratings of your unit prior to the above situation could be a
factor in regards to the resources available to your unit.
With the above thoughts in mind please complete the
following survey. NOTE: IN REGARDS TO THE ASSESSMENT SCALES
PROVIDED, YOU ARE NOT RESTRICTED TO RANKING A PROFILE AS 10,
20, 30, ETC. YOU CAN USE ANY INTEGER FROM 1 TO 9 9, i. e. 23,
55, 79, ETC.
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BASIC DESCRIPTIONS OF READINESS MODEL DIMENSIONS
PERSONNEL :
Percent Manning Lravel : Refers to total available strength
divided by structured strength.
Percent Critical MOSs : Refers to service-selected critical
MOSs of available strength divided by structured strength of
critical MOSs.
Percent E-^<s and Above : Refers to grade fill of service-
selected critical sergeants and above available divided by
structured strength of critical sergeants and above.
Service Experience : Refers to the experience of key officer
and enlisted personnel in MAGTF units. Relates to how long
they have served in the type of billet and unit they are
assigned to.
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES :
Percent Equipment : Refers to service selected combat-
essential equipment possessed divided by prescribed wartime
requirements
.
Percent Supplies : Refers to service-selected end items,
support equipment and supplies possessed and divided by
prescribed wartime requirements
EQUIPMENT CONDITION :
Percent Equipment Combat Ready : Refers to service-selected
combat-essential equipment possessed and combat ready
divided by prescribed wartime requirements.
Percent End Items Combat Ready : Refers to major service-
selected end items of equipment possessed and combat ready
divided by prescribed wartime requirements.
Modernization : Refers to the technical capabilities of on-
hand equipment. Relates to whether or not the unit possesses
state of the art equipment.
TRAINING:
Individual Skills Training : Refers to the capabilities of
individuals to perform skills required by their MOS.
Percent Unit Training Completed : Refers to the proficiency
level of air, ground and service support units. Relates to
the capabilities of air crews, infantry small units,
maintenance teams, howitzer crews, tank crews, radio
operators, etc.
(Note: UNITREP gives the option of reporting either "weeks
of training, or percent of unit training completed, or
percent of combat ready air crews." For the purpose of this
survey I have chosen to include only the above category in
that it can be related to each major component of a MAGTF
.
)
Joint MAGTF Element Training : Refers to the capability of
MAGTF elements to function as a coordinated air-ground team.
MAGTF and Navy Training : Refers to the capabilities of the
MAGTF to embark, debark and coordinate operations ashore
within a naval amphibious task force environment.
COMMAND, CONTROL
,
COMMUNICATIONS (C3) AND UNIT CLIMATE :
Unit Morale : Refers to the motivation of personnel in
regards to their unit and mission.
Unit Leadership : Refers to the leadership style of unit
commanders and personnel in other key billets.
Command
,
Control and Communications : Refers to the
abilities of the MAGTF and element staffs to command,
control and communicate to units under their cognizance.
Relates to the concepts of fire support coordination,
teamwork, equipment interfacing, etc.
Intelligence : Refers to the intelligence gathering and
analysis capabilities of MAGTF and element staffs.
Commanding Officer' s Judgement : Refers to MAGTF and element




EACH PROFILE YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
PERSONNEL. USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL APPEAR AT THE
BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN AS
REFERENCE FOR THIS SCALE.
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs
PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
12 3 4 fsj
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.







BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs




ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs







ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.









BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs










ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.






PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1 2(3J4 5 6 7 8 9
12 3 4 [51 6 789
6 7 8 9
5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3(4j 5
©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.






PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60
UNSAT Marginal
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR









PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.






PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 (5 J 6 7 8 9
12 3 4 5 (6j
12 3 4 C5
J
6
12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.









PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.










PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
4 5 6 7 8 9





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1 2 3(4PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs
PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.









PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60
UNSAT Marginal










PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5 6 7( 8 19
12 3 4 (T) 6
l(2j 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.







BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.









BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs
PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.










PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
A©
6U
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs










ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.





BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT MANNING LEVEL
PERCENT CRITICAL MOSs










ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.






PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE
SERVICE EXPERIENCE
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PERSONNEL.








EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES PROFILE S
ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:
EACH PROFILE YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL
APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1234(5J6 789
12 3 4 5 W
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 (5) 6 7 8 9
14 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5
12 3 4 5
7 8 9
8 9U
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5 6 ( 7 J* 9
)4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.





BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1 2(3J4 5 6 789
12 3 4 (5) 6 789©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 12 3 4 (5
J
6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 12 3 4 (5) 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1234 5 6 7 (8 J 9
PERCENT SUPPLIES 12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1234(5j6 789
12 3 4 5 ©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.





BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1 2 KV
12 3 4 5 (*6j 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES,
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT l(2J3 4 5 6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES l(2J3 4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1 2 3^4
J
5 6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1 2 3^4
J
5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1234^5^6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1 2 3 4 (5 J 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.





BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4(5©
'0'
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1234 5 6 7 ^8 J 9
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1 2( 3)4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1234 5^6)789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1 2^3
J
4 5 6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1 2 fT) 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.





BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5(6)
12 3 4 ©w 8
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
5 6 7 8 9
5 6 712 3 4
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1234 5 ( 6 ) 7 8 9
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1 2(30'
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
123^4^ 5 6 789
12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERCENT EQUIPMENT 1 2 3 4 f 5
J
6 789
PERCENT SUPPLIES 1234 5 6 7(8)9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.




ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION:
EACH PROFILE YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
EQUIPMENT CONDITION. USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL APPEAR
AT THE BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN
AS REFERENCE FOR THIS SCALE.
100
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
C?)% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 4 f 5
J
% END ITEMS CBT READY 12 3 4 5




ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234(5] 6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2( 3 )4
MODERNIZATION 1 2(3J4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5 ( 6 ) 7 8 9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 5 6 (7)89
MODERNIZATION 12 3 4 5
70 80 90
SAT
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60
UNSAT MARGINAL
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5 6 f 7 J8 9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2N j4 5 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 '6)789©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2^ 3 j4 5 6 789
7Q END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1 2 3^ 4J 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 4 fs
J
6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2 3 4 f 5 ) 6 789
MODERNIZATION ( 1
J
2 3 4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
102
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 12 3 4 5 6 7 f 8 J 9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 12 3 4 5 6
MODERNIZATION 12 3 4 5 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 4 f 5
J
6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 12 3 4 5
©MODERNIZATION 1234(5) 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 4 ( 5 J 6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 5^6^789
MODERNIZATION 123(4] 5 6 789©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
103
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY U2j3 4 5 6 7 89
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 f 2 ) 3 4 5 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234 5(6)789©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 ( 4 J 5 6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2 3f 4j 5 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234(5] 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 4 f 5
J
6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2 3 4 f 5 J 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 6(7)89
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
104
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 12 3 4 5 6 7 f 8
J
9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2 3 4 Cb
J
6





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION,
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60
UNSAT MARGINAL
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5 6 7 T 8
J
9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 12(3)4 5 6 789©
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5(6)789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 5 6(7)89©
MODERNIZATION 123(4)5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
105
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 ' 2 C 3
J
4 5 6 78 9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2(3 J4 5 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234 5(6)789©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
©% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5(6)789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 (5) 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1 2 3 f 4
J
5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 f 2
J
3 4 5 6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 5 6 78^9^
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 6(7)89W
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
106
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234 5 T 6
J
7 8 9
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1 2(3)4 5 6 789
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 16)7 89
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1 2 3 f 4 J 5 6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 1234 5 6 f 7
J
8 9
MODERNIZATION 123(4/5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
% EQUIP COMBAT READY 1234(5)6 789
% END ITEMS CBT READY 12 3 4 5 6 7^
MODERNIZATION 1234 5 6789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF EQUIPMENT CONDITION.





EACH PROFILE. YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
TRAINING? USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL APPEAR AT THE
BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN AS
REFERENCE FOR THIS SCALE.
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 4 (
•VX 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 12 3 4
• © 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 30 5 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2MJ 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 4 KV 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2 ( 3 )4 5 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 ( 3 )4 5 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING
.
^•^^
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 12 3 4 5 KDA 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 12 3 4 5 6 Q 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 12 3 4 5 f 6
J
7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1(2)3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40
UNSAT
50 60 70 80 90
MARGINAL SAT
109
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 12 3 4 5 6
^L )8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2CK 5 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 12 3
^0 !^
4 5 © 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 103 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING
.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 20k 5 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 12 3 4 © 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3(3 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 103 4 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
INDIV SKILLS TNG
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG




° n1 2 3( 4 J
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.









% UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 4
^J 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 © 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3 4 © 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7(09
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 4 KV 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3 C 4 J 5 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 ( 4 J 5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1( 2 )3 4 5 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED l( 2 (3 4 5 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 5 6 GJ8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 ( 4
J
5 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2 3 V 4 J 5 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3 4 Q 6 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
INDIV SKILLS TNG
7o UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.









BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG







ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.









% UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR




ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG







© 7 8 9
8 9
Cl>
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.




7o UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30
UNSAT
5 6 7 8 9
3 Q 7 8 9
5 6 7 8 9
50 60 70 80 90
MARGINAL SAT
INDIV SKILLS TNG
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR




ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
INDIV SKILLS TNG
7o UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60
UNSAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
1(2)3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12 3 4 5 6 7 8(9
12 3 4 5 6 Qs 9




BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3 4 5 KV 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2Ch 5 6 7 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 3 4 5 Q 7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 5 CD 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
INDIV SKILLS TNG 1 2 3^ 5 6 7 8 9
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED 1 2 3 4 5 6 C) 8 9
JOINT MAGTF TNG 1 2 •0 5 6 ^ i^7 8 9
MAGTF/NAVY TNG 1 2 3 4 5 6 GJ8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
INDIV SKILLS TNG
% UNIT TNG COMPLETED
JOINT MAGTF TNG
MAGTF/NAVY TNG
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 ( 5 ) 6 7 8 9
12 3 4
12 3 4 5
5 6
4 {^J 6
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING.






C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE PROFILES
ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE
EACH PROFILE YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE. USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL
APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS




CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
6 7 8 9(7)123 4
12 3 4 5









ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP
CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.




CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP




12 3 4 C5J
1 2 3(4 J 5
1(2)34 5
1 2 3( 4 ) 5^
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP








ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.





CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES 1 2 3 4 C 5 )
CO ' s JUDGEMENT 12 3 4 5 ( 6 J
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.




CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT
















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP
CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT ©
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.





CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR









ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP
CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO's JUDGEMENT
ENTER - YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP








ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE 1234 5 6 7(8)9
© ®UNIT LEADERSHIP 12 3 4
CMD , CNTL AND COMM 1 f 2
J
3 4 5 6 789
INTEL CAPABILITIES 1234 5 6 7^8 J9
CO's JUDGEMENT 1 2nj4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE 1234 5 6 7 f 8 J 9
UNIT LEADERSHIP 1 2M
J
4 5 6 78 9
CMD , CNTL AND COMM 1234 5 6 7 ( 8 J 9
INTEL CAPABILITIES 1234 5 6 f 7
J
8 9
CO's JUDGEMENT 1213)4 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE 1234 5 fs J 7 8 9
UNIT LEADERSHIP 1234 5 6 ( 7
J
8 9
CMD , CNTL AND COMM 123^4^ 5 6 789
INTEL CAPABILITIES 1234 (5) 6 789
CO's JUDGEMENT 1(2)34 5 6 789
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP










ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
UNIT LEADERSHIP 1 2 3 4 G> • 7 8 9
CMD, CNTL AND COMM 1 2 3
(
4 ) 5 6 7 8 9
INTEL CAPABILITIES 1 2 3 ( 4 ) 5 6 7 8 9
CO's JUDGEMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 rr^8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.




CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO ' s JUDGEMENT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR











5 ( 6 J 7w
8
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP








ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP
CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES








ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
UNIT MORALE
UNIT LEADERSHIP
CMD, CNTL AND COMM
INTEL CAPABILITIES
CO ' s JUDGEMENT
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF C3 AND COMMAND CLIMATE.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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MAGTF COMBAT READINESS PROFILES
ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS
EACH PROFILE YOU SEE PORTRAYS AN ALTERNATIVE IN TERMS OF THE
DIMENSIONS OR ATTRIBUTES OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS EARLIER
DEFINED.
CONSIDERING JUST THE INFORMATION YOU WILL BE SHOWN, WHAT IS
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS OVERALL?
RELY UPON YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION TO RATE OVERALL
MAGTF COMBAT READINESS. USE THE RATING SCALE THAT WILL
APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM OF EACH PROFILE. NOTE THE DESCRIPTIONS
GIVEN AS REFERENCE FOR THIS SCALE.
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1 2 3UJ 5
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT









ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS,
















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.





















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERSONNEL 1 2( 3
J4 5
6 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 12 3 4 6 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT CONDITION 12 3Q 5 6 7 8 9
TRAINING 103 4 5 6 7 8 9
C3 AND CLIMATE 1 2 3^4
J
5 6 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS. SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.



















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERSONNEL 1 2 3 4 KV 6 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT CONDITION 1 2 3 f 4
J
i 5 6 7 8 9
TRAINING 1 2 3 C 4j 5 6 7 8 9
C3 AND CLIMATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 •0
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF i:OMBAT READINESS.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
PERSONNEL 1 2 3 I 4
J
1 5 6 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 1 2 3 ( 4 J 5 6 7 8 9
EQUIPMENT CONDITION 1 2 3 4 Q 6 7 8 9
TRAINING 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
C3 AND CLIMATE 1 2 3 4 5 © 7 8 9
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF iZOMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
PERSONNEL
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 12 3 4
EQUIPMENT CONDITION 12 3 4
TRAINING 12 3 4
C3 AND CLIMATE 12 3 4
BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR





ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.








BELOW STND MIN ABOV SUPERIOR
12 3 4 5 6 7(8 J 9
12 3 4 C5J 6
l(2j3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
5 61 2(3V
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS






















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT







12 3 4 5 6
1 2 3(4J 5 6






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
129











ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT










ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT



















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT
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1 2 3' 4
ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS,



















ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.
USE THIS SCALE: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
UNSAT MARGINAL SAT






ENTER YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAGTF COMBAT READINESS.










My experience has primarily been with the following types of
units (circle one please):
Air Ground Cbt Serv/Spt Other (Please state)
I have primarily served on (circle one please):
East coast West coast
Overseas (If so where?)
Other (Please state)
What factors would you want to add to the above model?
Please provide any other comments you would like to make in
response to this survey.
THANKS MUCH FOR YOUR INPUT AND TIME!
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APPENDIX E
RANDOM NUMBER DATA USED FOR THE COMBAT READINESS
PROFILES AND THE SAS PROGRAM
USED TO CREATE IT
This appendix contains the random number data set used
to create the profiles contained in Appendix D. The actual
SAS output document [Ref. 15] contained additional
statistical output data, to include a 10 x 20 data set of
random variables. Yet, in that I only used the first five
columns of subject data set, only those numbers used are
displayed. Additionally, the SAS program that created this
data set (written by Professor Paul J. Hoffman) is provided.
(Note: If a profile had two variables to assess, I used
only columns 1 and 2; if it had three variables, I used
columns 1 to 3; etc.)
A. RANDOM NUMBER DATA SET USED TO CREATE READINESS PROFILES
IN APPENDIX D
COL 1 COL 2 COL 3 COL 4 COL 5
ROW 1 5 6 4 3 4
ROW 2 5 3 3 5 4
ROW 3 6 7 6 2 2
ROW 4 7 3 6 2 6
ROW 5 3 5 4 2 4
ROW 6 5 5 1 4 6
133
7 7 5 6
6 5 8 6
6 4 4 9
2 6 7 4
4 5 5 6
5 7 5 7
5 2 8 3
3 8 7 3
7 4 5 2
3 6 4 3
5 4 4 7
9 7 6 5
3 6 6 6
7 4 7 6
8 6 5 5
Note: (*) = a random row of numbers from column 6 to 10
(not shown) . These numbers were going to be used for a
consistency check, yet this procedure was not conducted for
this study.

















FILE: KAISEF.5 SAS Al
//K.AISER5 -JOB (2351 ,1104-) , 'KAISERV ,CLASS=A
//*MAIN ORG=NPGVM1.2 351P
// EXEC SAS
//SAS. WORK DO SPACE=ICYL, (10, 10)
)
//SYSIN DO *
*****PRQQUCES A SCORE MATRIX WHCSE CORRELATION MATRIX
***** ROUTINE FOR ENTERING YOUR DESIRED CORRELATION
*** IN THIS EXAMPLE, WE ARE USING A 5-VARIA6LE
































































«***FINDS ALL PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF
PROC FACTOR DATA = CORRMATk ( 7YP E = CORR
)
PRCC MATRIX;
FETCH FACT DAT A=S7 ATS ( TYP E=F ACTOR) ;
PRINT FACT;
*****ENTER YOUR OWN VALUES FOR N (NO. OF DBS)
OF ROWS ANO COLS OF YCJR CORRELATION MATRIX;
VALUES FOR MEANS AND STD'S OF THE VARIABLES.


































































































M MUST MATCH THE NO.
ENTER YOUR OWN DESIRED
IN THIS VERSION OF THE
AND M (NO. OF VARS) HERE
pro; £ SDS
m=io; n=20;mean=5; SD=1.3;
41" 3 H + 3 iS
J2= J I + (M - 1) ;
CONSTS = J. (6, 1,0) ;
CONSTSd,) = N: C0NSTS12,) = M; C ONST 3 ( 3 , )= Jl ; CONSTS ( 4-, ) =J2 ;
CONSTS (5,) = MEAN; CONSTS (6, J = SO;
F = FACT ( Jl:J2, 1:M) ;
F = F«;
PRINT F; OUTPUT r GUT = F;
* COMMENT NOW CREATE A MATRIX OF RANDOM NORMAL DEVIATES, EXACTLY (0,1);
X=J.(M,N);
DO 1=1 TC M; DO J = l TO N;
X( I ,J )=NQRMAL( 0) ; END; END;
x = x •
;
OUTPUT X OUT = XRAND;
OUTPUT CONSTS OUT = CONSTS;
PROC STANDARD DATA = XRANO OUT = ZSCOkES MEAN = STJ = 1;
PRCC MATRIX;
FETCH CONSTS DATA = CONSTS;
N=CONSTS (1 ,) ; M=C0NSTS(2, ); MEAN=CONSTS ( 5 , ) ;SD=CONSTS ( 6, ) ; PRINT CONSTS;
FETCH Z DATA = Z5C0RES;
Z=Z«:
** =**GENERmTES A SCORE MATRIX (Z-SCORES) .»HOSE INTERCDRKELATIONS ARE ALL ZERO.;
FETCH F DATA = F;
xx = Z*Z';
EI GEN EVALS EVECS XX;
EVALS=CIAG(EVALS) :
EVALS = ABS(EVALS) ;
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FILE^ KAISER5 SAS Al
MRCOT=EVALS *rf (-.5 ) ;
PRINT EVECS; PRINT EVALS; PRINT MR3CT;
SQN=N ##(.5);
NOTE THESE ARE ORTHOGONAL VARIABLESt IF YOU WISH TO USE THEM.;
ZGRTHOG=MROQT*EVE:o « *Z*SQN; ZORTHOG=ZORTHDG« ; PRINT zorthcg;
*****FINALLY, PRODUCES THE DESIRED SCORE MATRIX AS ZWANTED.;
*****YGU CAN SUBJECT THE COLUMNS TO LINEAR TRANSGRMS, AS YOU rflSH.;
PAGE;
NOTE PAGE;
NOTE THIS IS YOUR DESIRED SET OF VARIABLES;
NOTE ALGORITHM 31 HANK KAISER— IMPLEMENTED IN SAS BY PAUL J. HOFFMAN;
ZWANTED=F*ZORTHOG' ; ZW ANT ED= ( SD *ZW ANTED+ME AN) • ; PRINT ZWANTED;
ZWANTED=INT(ZWANTED+.5) ; PRINT ZWANTED;
OUTPUT Z0RTH3G OUT = ZGRTHOG; OUTPUT ZWANTED OUT=ZWANTED;
PROC CORR DATA = ZWANTED NGPROB;
TITLE INTERCCRRELATIGiMS Oh YOUR DESIRED DATA SET. CHECK THEM YOURSELF
TITLE1 "SD'S ARE PCPULATION ESTIMATES.";
TITLE2 "MULTIPLY BY (N-D/N TG SEE THAT THEY ARE DESIRED STD'S.";
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APPENDIX -F
STATISTICAL TERMS, FORMULATIONS, AND SAS PROGRAMS
USED FOR DATA ANALYSIS
The information in this appendix is intended to provide
only a basic understanding of the statistical concepts,
Bootstrap methodology, and SAS programs used for data
analysis. Due to the complexity of the processes used, I
will attempt to describe only necessary terms and
formulations. Accordingly, only examples of the many
repetitive processes used will be given.
A. BASIC REVIEW OF STATISTICAL TERMS
Provided below are some basic definitions of terms that
should be helpful: • [Ref. 19]
- Statistics : Refers to the collection, presentation,
analysis, and utilization of numerical data to make
inferences and reach decisions in the face of
uncertainty.
- Inferential Statistics : Refers to the process of
reaching generalizations about the whole (called the
population) by examining a portion (called the sample).
In order for this job to be valid, the sample must be
representative of the population.
- Regression Analysis : Refers to the relationship between
one variable to be explained (the dependent variable Y)
and one or more explanatory (or independent X)
variables. When there is only one independent variable
(X), you have simple regression. When you have more




- Linear Regression Analysis ; Refers to an assumption
that there is an approximate linear relationship between
X and Y. That is, if the value of X was plotted in
reference to the value of Y, the values of X and Y would
fall on or near a straight line.
- Coefficients (B
)
: Refers to parameter estimates
of the independent variables. That is, an estimate (bN )
measures the change in (Y) for a unit change in (XN ) ,
while holding the other (Xs) constant.
2
- Coefficient of Multiple Determination (R
_)_: Refers to
the proportion of the total variation in Y "explained"
by the multiple regression of Y on X-,, X~, ....
This means that the adequacy of a linear model can be
assessed by an inspection of
2
tne magnitude of (R ) . The
maximum value possible of (R ) is one. Thus, the closer
a (R ) value is to one, the more adequate is the linear
model used.
- Example : A three-variable linear regression model can
be written as:
Y. = b Q + b 1 Xn + b 2 X 2i + b 3 X 3i
Note: b~ refers to the intercept term and can be used
to gauge the slope of a regression line, if it was
plotted
.
B. BOOTSTRAPPING 'S USE OF THE LINEAR MODEL
The excerpt that follows provides a good overview of how




The linear model is one in which
judgments are described as a simple
weighted sum of the values of the
information available. For a given
clinician judging a number of people,
we let J represent the judgment and
consider it as a dependent variable.
The dimensions of information are
designated by A's. These will, of
course, be independent variables.
If there are k sources of information,
the linear additive model can be de-
scribed as follows:
-W(A\)
• -1,2,. • h
Since we are interested in a weighted
sum of the A', we may write
/ -A t+AiXx+AiXt+ • • • +A kXk .
If the A, are so chosen as to yield the
best possible weighted sum, i.e., so
that the composite scores correlate
maximally with /, the model is
equivalent to a linear multiple re-
gression equation wherein the
weights to be applied to the inde-
pendent variables are so chosen as to
minimize the error in estimating an
actual dependent variable from the
weighted composite.
Application of multiple regression
procedures to the problems of judg-
ment has been suggested by Bruns-
wik (1947), and by Hammond (1955)
Todd (1954) reports a study using
regression coefficients and the multi-
ple correlation coefficient for a de-
scription of the clinical judgment
process, where the task was to judge
intelligence from a selected number
of Rorschach signs. While such
studies provide interesting implica-
tions, it should be stressed that there
are serious limitations with respect
to the interpretation of results-
limitations which may be minimised
or overcome only through a detailed
examination of the rationale under-
ving the model, and through re-
formulations or revisions of the
model, should this be necessary So
as to insure the appropriateness of
the linear model as a device for
characterizing the judgment process
we consider in detail some of us
properties, and provide the particu-
lar reformulations where necessarv
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in the first place, and by virtue of
the experimental control employed
in the collection of the data, the
only source of reliable judgment
variance is from the information
supplied. This is in objective form,
e.g., it appears as a number, a desig-
nated category, a position along a
continuumtetc. Often these data ap-
pear as test scores on a set of proto-
cols being judged. Assuming that a
judge combined the information in
linear additive fashion, the multiple
regression analysis will be quite ef-
fective as a tool for describing the
judgment process; i.e., the set of
regression weights when applied to
the corresponding predictors can
quite properly serve as a model for
judgment. Thus, the adequacy of
the linear model can be assessed by
inspection of the magnitude of mul-
tiple R. If the judge integrates data
in additive fashion as opposed to
configurational or pattern analysis,
the linear multiple correlation will
approach unity when corrected for
attenuation. Lesser values of R sug-
gest progressively lesser utility for
the linear model.
Secondly, it may be noted that
the regression weights signify, with
certain limitations, the emphasis or
importance attached to each of the
predictor variables by the judge.
Large coefficients mean, empirically,
that the corresponding predictors can
account for large proportions of the
variance of judgment; and a pre-
dictor with a small beta coeffiicent
contributes little beyond the con-
tribution of other predictors. In
practice, characterization of the
judgment process by means of beta
coefficients has three limitations:
la) since /s differ with respect to the
size of their multiple R, direct com-
parisons of sets of beta coefficients
between Js is not meaningful; (6)
beta coefficients do not account for
all the predictable variance; and (c)
beta coefficients do not allow for the
assessment of the independent con-
tribution of each predictor. What
would be more appropriate would be
a set of weights which are compar-
able from one J to the next, which
are capable theoretically of account-
ing for all of the predictable variance,
and which carry exact interpreta-
tion in terms of components of vari-
ance.
C. BOOTSTRAPPING VIA SAS
To obtain the statistical data necessary to derive the
values in Tables 7.2 to 7.7, 54 SAS programs were compiled
and processed. That is, a SAS analysis was conducted for
each combat readiness profile (six profiles) for each group
(nine groups) . What follows is a narration of only one SAS
analysis for one group. The exact process was duplicated
for each group/profile by changing the X and J variables
accordingly.
J is used in lieu of Y to denote the responses of those
surveyed. That is, each survey participant was assigned a J
value, i.e., Jl, J2, etc. A X was used to denote a
readiness factor. That is, XI = % manning level, X2 = %
critical MOS, etc.
The SAS program example that follows was for the "ground
field grade" sample group, in respect to the survey's
"personnel" model profile:
DATA DIM1












Jll = Jll + J/10;
IF OBS t 21;
END;
PROC REG DATA = MAJOR1;
MODEL Jl - Jll = XI - X4;
OUTPUT OUT = PERSDATA;
PROC PRINT DATA = PERSDATA;
Each line of the example SAS program above refers to a
procedure to be executed. For those interested in a
detailed description of each of the above procedures, see
Reference 17.
Of particular note in the above program is the "Jll"
value. Subject group was composed of only ten survey
respondents. Yet, by assigning "Jll" to equal and
subsequently denoting that "Jll = Jll + J/10", an aggregate
group average value assessment was obtained. Appropriate
aggregate group averages were computed for each group.
Also of interest is the "ARRAY"... procedure. The
"ARRAY PROC" allows one to process many variables the same
way. That is, in regards to this study, the "ARRAY PROC"
was used to consolidate multiple survey responses (Js)
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against the same "profile" (Xs) . For example, all ten
GNDFGs, four GNDCOLSs, ten GNDCGs, etc., were processed
against the appropriate profile at the same time.
D. AGGREGATE GROUP STATISTICS
Selected statistics from the SAS output, for each of the
54 programs, were extracted and compiled onto a Lotus 1,2,3
spreadsheet [Ref. 18]. The data sets that follow depict the
aggregate group values selected for analysis.
In regards to the data displayed, only the following
values were used for analysis in this study:
R Squared
X vt Beta CoefficientsN
WT (Normalized Weights)
The other items displayed could be used for further
statistical analysis, i.e., significance testing. Yet,
again due to the constraints of time and conducting single
person research, further statistical analysis was not
conducted.
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OVERALL READINESS PROFILE DATA:
GENERAL DATA:
OBS R SQR DEP MEAN STD
.
F VALUE P>F
GCOL(4) 0.7500 42.5600 11.4000 8.4800 0.0007
GFG(IO) 0.9000 44.5000 11.7300 24.4400 0.0001
GCG(IO) 0.9600 50.3100 10.0300 73.0200 0.0001
ACOL(2) 0.9400 46.1300 11.5400 45.4000 0.0001
AFG(5) 0.8900 46.8400 13.8100 23.7700 0.0001
ACG(5) 0.8100 54.3000 8.9800 11.8500 0.0001
CSSCOL(l) 0.7500 35.2100 9.3500 8.4500 0.0007
CSSFG(4) 0.7000 45.8400 7.9900 6.4500 0.0026
CSSCG(5) 0.8100 49.0000 9.5200 11.8800 0.0001
INTERCEPT DATA
OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL(4) -9.9200 9.4300 -1.0500 0.3106
GFG(IO) -4.8900 4.6400 -1.0500 0.0017
GCG(IO) -6.4100 3.2000 -2.0100 0.0647
ACOL(2) -20.2700 4.6200 -4.3900 0.0006
AFG(5) -28.8000 7.4400 -3.8700 0.0017
ACG(5) 8.6400 6.6200 1.3300 0.2063
CSSCOL(l) -7.9100 7.7400 -1.0200 0.3243
CSSFG(4) 5.2300 7.3000 0.7200 0.4846
CSSCG(5) -1.8100 6.9000 -0.2600 0.7969
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PERSONNEL (XI) DATA:
OBS X1B SE T P" WT
GCOL(4) 4.6100 0.8400 5.5000 0.0001 0.4450
GFG(IO) 2.1200 0.4100 5.1300 0.0002 0.2150
GCG(IO) 1.9300 0.2800. 6.7800 0.0001 0.1700
ACOL(2) 3.7800 0.4100 9.2000 0.0001 0.2861
AFG(5) 3.3600 0.6600 5.0700 0.0002 0.2224
ACG(5) 2.0200 0.5800 3.4900 0.0036 0.2215
CSSCOL(l) 3.7800 0.6900 5.4900 0.0001 0.4431
CSSFG(4) 1.9900 0.6500 3.0600 0.0084 0.2460
CSSCG(5) 3.1200 0.6100 5.0900 0.0002 0.3089
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES QUANTITY (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 2.0000 0.8200 2.4300 0.0292 0.1931
GFG(IO) 1.5600 0.4100 3.8400 0.0018 0.1582
GCG(IO) 1.7000 0.22800 6.0800 0.0001 0.1498
ACOL(2) 2.0500 0.4000 5.0800 0.0002 0.1552
AFG(5) 1.8400 0.6500 2.8200 0.0135 0.1218
ACG(5) 1.4800 0.5700 2.5900 0.0213 0.1623
CSSCOL(l) 1.6300 0.6800 2.4000 0.0307 0.1911
CSSFG(4) 1.4000 0.6400 2.2000 0.0452 0.1731
CSSCG(5) 2.1400 0.6000 3.5500 0.0032 0.2119
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EQUIPMENT CONDITION (X3) DATA
OBS X3B SE T F WT
GCOL(4) 1.3000 0.8500 1.5300 0.1496 0.1255
GFG(IO) 1.5400 0.4200 3.6700 0.0025 0.1562
GCG(IO) 1.7600 0.2900 6.1100 0.0001 0.1551
ACOL(2) 1.9700 0.4200 4.7400 0.0003 0.1491
AFG(5) 2.1100 0.6700 3.1400 0.0072 0.1396
ACG(5) 1.7200 0.5900 2.9200 0.0111 0.1886
CSSCOL(l) 1.0700 0.7000 1.5300 0.1489 0.1254
CSSFG(4) 1.4900 0.6600 2.2700 0.0397 0.1842
CSSCG(5) 2.0000 0.6200 3.2100 0.0063 0.1980
TRAINING (X4) DATA:
OBS X4B SE T P WT
GCOM4) 1.0000 0.8100 1.2400 0.2353 0.0965
GFG(IO) 2.0200 0.4000 5.0400 0.0002 0.'2049
GCG(IO) 3.4600 0.2800 12.5700 0.0001 0.3048
ACOL(2) 2.0600 0.4000 5.1900 0.0001 0.1559
AFG(5) 4.1200 0.6400 6.4300 0.0001 0.2727
ACG(5) 2.9300 0.5600 5.2200 0.0001 0.3213
CSSCOL(l) 0.8400 0.6700 1.2600 0.2273 0.0985
CSSFG(4) 1.5400 0.6200 2.4600 0.0278 0.1904
CSSCG(5) 1.4900 0.5900 2.5000 0.0254 0.1475
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COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS (C3) AND CLIMATE (X5) DATA
OBS X5B SE T P" WT
GCOL(4) 1.4500 0.8200 1.7700 0.0990 0.1400
GFG(10) 2.6200 0.4100 6.4600 0.0001 0.2657
GCG(IO) 2.5000 0.2800 8.9200 0.0001 0.22O3
ACOL(2) 3.3500 0.4000 8.3100 0.0001 0.2536
AFG(5) 3.6800 0.6500 5.6700 0.0001 0.2435
ACG(5) 0.9700 0.5700 1.7000 0.1118 0.1064
CSSCOL(l) 1.2100 0.6800 1.7900 0.0944 0.1419
CSSFG(4) 1.6700 0.6400 2.6100 0.0205 0.2064




OBS R SQR DEP MEAN STD F VALUE P>F
GCOL(4) 0.9200 51.7500 13.8100 43.5200 0.0001
GFG(IO) 0.9200 48.6500 13.5000 43.9000 0.0001
GCG(IO) 0.9200 51.9500 11.5700 45.2200 0.0001
ACOL(2) 0.8400 49.6300 12.9000 19.7000 0.0001
AFG(5) 0.9400 49.6500 13.9600 54.0900 0.0001
ACG(5) 0.9500 51.7000 12.8300 70.4300 0.0001
CSSCOL(l) 0.6600 51.1900 12.7100 7.1200 0.0020
CSSFG(4) 0.9200 51.0000 10.6500 45.7500 0.0001
CSSCG(5) 0.9000 48.7000 14.3300 35.0700 0.0001
INTERCEPT DATA:
OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL(4) -12.4000 5.6100 -2.2100 0.0431
GFG(IO) -16.8000 5.4800 -3.0800 0.0076
GCG(IO) -7.4400 4.6200 -1.6100 0.1282
ACOL(2) -8.5100 7.4400 -1.1400 0.2707
AFG(5) -21.5600 5.1200 -4.2100 0.0008
ACG(5) -14.2300 4.1600 -3.4200 0.0038
CSSCOL(l) -2.3800 10.7800 -0.2200 0.8278
CSSFG(4) -10.5835 10.7415 -12.2593 0.3704
CSSCG(5) -18.4363 11.0925 -2.0416 0.2011
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PERCENT MANNING LEVEL (XI) DATA:
OBS X1B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 5.7900 0. 5500 10. 4400 0.0001 0.4570
GFG (10) 5.7300 0.5400 10.5900 0.0001 0.4425
GCG(IO) 3.6800 0.4600 8.0500 0.0001 0. 3116
ACOL (2) 5.4700 0.7400 72.4400 0.0001 0.4769
AFG(5) 4.6300 0. 5100 9.5100 0.0001 0.3274
ACG (5) 4.6300 0.4100 11.2400 0.0001 0.3545
CSSCOL(l) 2. 6400 1.0600 2. 4700 0. 0259 0. 2596
CSSFG (4) 4.4700 0.4200 10.7000 0.0001 0.4352
CSSCG(5) 5.8400 0. 6.300 9.6300 . 0.0001 0.4272
PERCENT CRITICAL MOS (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 2.0800 0.5400 3.8300 0.0016 0.1642
GFG(IO) 2.3600 0.5300 4.4400 0.0005 0.1822
GCG(IO) 2.0900 0.4500 4.6600 0.0003 0.1770
ACOL(2) 2.6700 0.7200 3.6900 0.0022 0.2328
AFG(5) 2.1800 0.5000 4.3900 0.0005 0.1542
ACG(5) 3.6500 0.4000 9.0500 0.0001 0.2795
CSSCOL(l) 4.6300 1.0400 4.4300 0.0005 0.4553
CSSFG(4) 2.6300 0.4100 6.4200 0.0001 0.2561
CSSCG(5) 3.0500 0.6200 4.9000 0.0002 0.2231
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PERCENT E-5s AND ABOVE (X3) DATA:
OBS X3B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 1.4100 0.5600 2.5100 0.0239 0.1113
GFG(IO) 2.2900 0.5500 4.1700 0.0008 0.1768
GCG(IO) 2.9600 0.4600 6.3900 0.0001 0.2506
ACOL(2) 1.9900 0.7500 2.6700 0.0175 0.1735
AFG(5) 4.0900 0.5100 7.9700 0.0001 0.2893
ACG(5) 1.8200 0.4200 4.3700 0.0005 0.1394
CSSCOL(l) 1.6300 1.0800 1.5100 0.1531 0.1603
CSSFG(4) 1.6700 0.4200 3.9300 0.0013 0.1626
CSSCG(5) 2.8100 0.6400 4.3500 0.0006 0.2056
SERVICE EXPERIENCE (X4 ) DATA:
OBS X4B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 3.3900 0.5400 6.3100 0.0001 0.2676
GFG(IO) 2.5700 0.5200 4.9000 0.0002 0.1985
GCG(IO) 3.0800 0.4400 6.6700 0.0001 0.2608
ACOL(2) 1.3400 0.7100 1.8800 0.0796 0.1168
AFG(5) 3.2400 0.4900 6.6100 0.0001 0.2291
ACG(5) 2.9600 0.4000 7.4300 0.0001 0.2266
CSSCOL(l) 1.2700 1.0300 1.2300 0.2363 0.1249
CSSFG(4) 1.5000 0.4000 3.7000 0.0021 0.1461
CSSCG(5) 1.9700 0.6100 3.2000 0.0059 0.1441
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EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (QUANTITY) PROFILE DATA:
GENERAL DATA:
OBS R SQR DEP MEAN STD F VALUE P>F
GCOL(4) 0.8400 45.5000 17.3500 43.5300 0.0001
GFG(IO) 0.8900 45.4800 14.1300 71.6900 0.0001
GCG(IO) 0.9200 49.2500 13.9000 97.2500 0.0001
ACOL(2) 0.8400 47.6300 14.0500 126.2700 0.0001
AFG(5) 0.8600 48.2000 17.0200 54.3000 0.0001
ACG(5) 0.8900 50.9000 14.8400 66.6000 0.0001
CSSCOL(l) 0.6900 48.0000 17.5000 18.7200 0.0001
CSSFG(4) 0.9100 47.9400 12.8900 87.1400 0.0001
CSSCG(5) 0.8700 46.4500 14.9200 58.2600 0.0001
INTERCEPT DATA:
OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL(4) -17.0600 7.0200 -2.4300 0.0264
GFG(IO) -7.2500 4.6000 -1.5800 0.1337
GCG(IO) -3.9600 3.9400 -1.0000 0.3291
ACOL(2) -6.8700 3.5300 -1.9500 0.0684
AFG(5) -13.4700 6.2700 -2.1500 0.0462
ACG(5) -4.9100 4.9900 -0.9600 0.3492
CSSCOL(l) -4.2400 11.2300 -0.3800 0.7088
CSSFG(4) -0.7200 3.8400 -0.1900 0.8538
CSSCG(5) -8.2500 5.3200 -1.5500 0.1401
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PERCENT EQUIPMENT (XI) DATA:
OBS X1B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 7.3800 0.9300 7.8700 0.0001 0.6029
GFG(IO) 6.1900 0.6200 10.0500 0.0001 0.5998
GCG(IO) 5.8000 0.5300 11.0000 0.0001 0.5566
ACOL(2) 5.6800 0.4700 12.0300 0.0001 0.5318
AFG(5) 7.6100 0.8400 9.0800 0.0001 0.6310
ACG(5) 6.1300 0.6700 9.1900 0.0001 0.5619
CSSCOL(l) 8.5300 1.5000 5.6800 0.0001 0.7021
CSSFG(4) 6.6500 0.5100 10.9900 0.0001 0.6327
CSSCG(5) 6.5800 0.7100 9.2400 0.0001 0.6150
PERCENT SUPPLIES (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 4.8600 0.9200 5.2700 0.0001 0.3971
GFG(IO) 4.1300 0.6000 6.8400 0.0001 0.4002
GCG(IO) 4.6200 0.5200 8.9400 0.0001 0.4434
ACOL(2) 5.0000 0.4600 10.7800 0.0001 0.4682
AFG(5) 4.4500 0.8200 5.4200 0.0001 0.3690
ACG(5) 4.7800 0.6600 7.9200 0.0001 0.4381
CSSCOL(l) 3.6200 1.4700 2.5000 0.0250 0.2979
CSSFG(4) 3.8600 0.5000 7.6800 0.0001 0.3673
CSSCG(5) 4.1200 0.7000 5.8900 0.0001 0.3850
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EQUIPMENT CONDITION PROFILE DATA
GENERAL DATA:
OBS R SQR DEP MEAN STD F VALUE P>F
GCOL(4) 0.8500 46.2500 13.8000 32.3700 0.0001
GFG(IO) 0.9000 45.8300 11.8400 49.2000 0.0001
GCG(IO) 0.9400 48.7800 11.5200 77.4300 0.0001
ACOL(2) 0.9300 47.2500 11.7200 73.5400 0.0001
AFG(5) 0.9200 50.0000 15.5900 64.9000 0.0001
ACG(5) 0.8300 54.6000 10.2300 26.8800 0.0001
CSSCOL(l) 0.8100 49.0000 14.5000 22.3000 0.0001
CSSFG(4) 0.9000 50.6000 11.7200 47.7500 0.0001
CSSCG(5) 0.8600 46.2500 9.8600 33.9500 0.0001
INTERCEPT DATA:
OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL (4) -6.,0700 6.,5300 -0.,9300 0.,3669
GFG(IO) -0. 9200 4. , 6600 -0. 2000 0.,8457
GCG (10) -2. 5300 3.,6800 -0. 6900 0.,5023
ACOL(2) 0. 3300 3. 8300 0. 0900 0. 9330
AFG (5) -17. 5300 5.,4100 -3. 2400 0.,0051
ACG(5) 11. 7600 5. 2400 22. 2500 0. 0392
CSSCOL (1) 8. 5000 10.,5900 0. 8000 0. 4341
CSSFG(4) 2. 3700 4.,6700 0. 5100 0. 6189
CSSCG (5) 5. 6100 , 4.,5700 1. 2300 0.,2381
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PERCENT EQUIPMENT COMBAT READY (XI) DATA:
OBS X1B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 6.2200 0.7100 8.6800 0.0001 0.6062
GFG(IO) 5.0400 0.5100 9.8900 0.0001 0.5502
GCG(IO) 4.9800 0.4000 12.3500 0.0001 0.4936
ACOL(2) 5.3200 0.4200 12.6600 0.0001 0.5789
AFG(5) 6.8900 0.5900 11.6300 0.0001 0.5192
ACG(5) 3.6200 0.5700 6.3200 0.0001 0.4294
CSSCOL(l) 9.3200 1.1600 8.0300 0.0001 0.7741
CSSFG(4) 5.0700 0.5100 9.9000 0.0001 0.5422
CSSCG(5) 4.0500 0.5000 8.1000 0.0001 0.5075
PERCENT END ITEMS COMBAT READY (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL (4) 3.4500 0.7100 4.9000 0.0002 0.3363
GFG(IO) 3. 6900 0. 5000 7. 3600 0. 0001 0. 4028
GCG (10) 3.3100 0.4000 8.3700 0.0001 0.3280
ACOL(2) 3. 3600 0.4100 8. 1400 0. 0001 0. 3656
AFG (5) 4.3200 0.5800 7.4300 0.0001 0.3255
ACG(5) 3. 5500 0. 5600 6. 3000 0.0001 0.4211
CSSCOL (1) 1.7200 1.1400 0.1510 0.1504 0. 1429
CSSFG (4) 3.4900 0. 5000 6. 9400 0. 0001 0. 3733
CSSCG (5) 2.9900 0.4900 6.0800 0.0001 0.3747
153
MODERNIZATION (X3) DATA:
OBS X3B SE T "P WT
GCOL(4) 0.5900 0.7300 0.8100 0.4307 0.0575
GFG(IO) 0.4300 0.5200 0.8200 0.4223 0.0469
GCG(IO) 1.8000 0.4100 4.4100 0.0004 0.1784
ACOL(2) 0.5100 0.4300 1.2100 0.2446 0.0555
AFG(5) 2.0600 0.6000 3.4400 0.0034 0.1552
ACG(5) 1.2600 0.5800 2.1600 0.0463 0.1495
CSSCOL(l) -1.0000 1.1700 -0.8500 0.4068 -0.0831
CSSFG(4) 0.7900 0.5200 1.5300 0.1460 0.0845




OBS R SQR DEP MEAN STD .F VALUE P>F
GCOL(4) 0.8900 52.0000 11.3800 30.9000 0.0001
GFG(IO) 0.9500 46.9000 11.5600 69.0400 0.0001
GCG(IO) 0.9600 50.7200 11.0000 99.8000 0.0001
ACOL(2) 0.9400 50.7000 8.3400 58.4900 0.0001
AFG(5) 0.9400 50.7000 13.5000 59.1600 0.0001
ACG(5) 0.8800 53.9500 10.1700 28.8300 0.0001
CSSCOL(l) 0.7100 53.7500 12.0400 9.1000 0.0006
CSSFG(4) 0.8600 49.5900 7.6400 23.4000 0.0001
CSSCG(5) 0.9600 48.4000 11.5100 85.5000 0.0001
INTERCEPT DATA:
OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL(4) 0.2800 5.3900 0.0500 0.9591
GFG(IO) -6.0600 3.7800 -1.6200 0.1301
GCG(IO) -3.8100 3.0200 -1.2600 0.2258
ACOL(2) 7.5500 2.9500 2.5600 0.0219
AFG(5) -16.5200 2.7500 -3.4800 0.0034
ACG(5) 6.5300 2.9700 1.3100 0.2089
CSSCOL(l) 20.8500 13.6200 1.5300 0.1467
CSSFG(4) 14.6300 4.1000 3.5700 0.0028
CSSCG(5) -8.9800 3.4000 -2.6400 0.0186
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INDIVIDUAL SKILLS TRAINING (XI) DATA:
OBS X1B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 4.5100 0.5300 8.4500 0.0001 0.4417
GFG(IO) 4.9900 0.3700 13.3300 0.0001 0.4789
GCG(IO) 4.7700 0.3000 15.9800 0.0001 0.4429
ACOL(2) 3.1100 0.2900 10.6500 0.0001 0.3685
AFG(5) 5.2700 0.4700 11.2200 0.0001 0.3974
ACG(5) 3.8200 0.4900 7.7700 0.0001 0.4086
CSSCOL(l) 7.1100 1.3400 5.2800 0.0001 0.5390
CSSFG(4) 2.9600 0.4000 7.3200 0.0001 0.4302
CSSCG(5) 4.3300 0.3400 12.8800 0.0001 0.3822
PERCENT UNIT TRAINING COMPLETED (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 3.6100 '0.5200 6.8900 0.0001 0.3536
GFG(IO) 3.5400 0.3700 9.6500 0.0001 0.3397
GCG(IO) 2.7100 0.3000 9.2600 0.0001 0.2516
ACOL(2) 2.3400 0.2800 8.0400 0.0001 0.2773
AFG(5) 4.1600 0.4600 9.0300 0.0001 0.3137
ACG(5) 3.3500 0.4800 6.9400 0.0001 0.3583
CSSCOL(l) 3.3200 1.3200 2.5100 0.0237 0.2517
CSSFG(4) 2.3400 0.4000 5.9000 0.0001 0.3401
CSSCG(5) 3.9300 0.3300 11.9100 0.0001 0.3469
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JOINT MAGTF ELEMENT TRAINING (X3) DATA:
OBS X3B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 0.9300 0.5400 1.7200 0.1064 0.0911
GFG(IO) 1.1300 0.3800 2.9900 0.0092 0.1084
GCG(IO) 1.7900 0.3000 5.9200 0.0001 0.1662
ACOL(2) 1.2200 0.3000 4.1500 0.0009 0.1445
AFG(5) 2.3600 0.4800 4.9700 0.0002 0.1780
ACG(5) 1.1800 0.4900 2.3800 0.0311 0.1262
CSSCOL(l) -2.1400 1.3400 -1.5600 0.1388 -0.1622
CSSFG(4) 0.9800 0.4100 2.3900 0.0302 0.1424
CSSCG(5) 1.5000 0.3400 4.3800 0.0005 0.1324
MAGTF AND NAVY TRAINING (X4) DATA:
OBS X4B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 1.1600 0.5200 2.2400 0.0407 0.1136
GFG(IO) 0.7600 0.3600 2.1100 0.0523 0.0729
GCG(IO) 1.5000 0.2900 5.1900 0.0001 0.1393
ACOL(2) 1.7700 0.2900 6.2900 0.0001 0.2097
AFG(5) 1.4700 0.4600 3.2500 0.0054 0.1109
ACG(5) 1.0000 0.4800 2.0900 0.0536 0.1070
CSSCOL(l) -0.6200 1.3000 -0.4800 0.6385 -0.0470
CSSFG(4) 0.6000 0.3900 1.5400 0.1444 0.0872
CSSCG(5) 1.5700 0.3300 4.8400 0.0002 0.1386
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COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS (C3) AND CLIMATE
GENERAL DATA
























































OBS INTCPTB SE T P
GCOL (4) -17. 1100 6.,0500 -2.,8300 0,,0134
GFG(IO) -15. 3100 4. 900 -3. 1200 0.,0075
GCG (10) -9. 7300 3.,4100 -2.,8500 0.,0128
ACOL(2) -12. 6400 8. 6000 -1. 4700 0. , 1635
AFG (5) -34. 9500 6.,5800 -5. 3000 0.,0001
ACG(5) 0. 5700 5. 3500 0. 1100 0. 9170
CSSCOL (1) -11. 1900 5.,4700 -2. 0500 0.,0599
CSSFG(4) 2. 6800 6. 1600 0. 4400 0. 6700
CSSCG (5) -10.,0000 3.,0700 -3. 2600 0.,0057
158
UNIT MORALE (XI) DATA
OBS X1B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 4.3400 0.5400 8.0500 0.0001 0.3401
GFG(IO) 2.4500 0.4400 5.6200 0.0001 0.2064
GCG(IO) 2.6800 0.3000 8.8400 0.0001 0.2248
ACOL(2) 1.7300 0.7700 2.2600 0.0406 0.1445
AFG(5) 4.0900 0.5900 6.9700 0.0001 0.2502
ACG(5) 2.8800 0.4700 6.0600 0.0001 0.2704
CSSCOL(l) 3.7200 0.4900 7.6600 0.0001 0.3049
CSSFG(4) 2.1700 0.55.00 3.9600 0.0014 0.2406
CSSCG(5) 2.1800 0.2700 7.9900 0.0001 0.1851
UNIT LEADERSHIP (X2) DATA:
OBS X2B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 2.0600 0.5300 3.9000 0.0016 0.1614
GFG(IO) 2.4300 0.4200 5.6800 0.0001 0.2047
GCG(IO) 3.9200 0.3000 13.1500 0.0001 0.3289
ACOL(2) 2.7000 0.7500 3.5900 0.0029 0.2256
AFG(5) 2.9000 0.5800 5.0400 0.0002 0.1774
ACG(5) 1.6900 0.4700 3.6200 0.0028 0.1587
CSSCOL(l) 2.0700 0.4800 4.3200 0.0007 0.1697
CSSFG(4) 1.7500 0.5400 3.2700 0.0056 0.1940
CSSCG(5) 3.1800 0.2700 11.8700 0.0001 0.2699
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COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (X3) DATA:
OBS X3B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 2.8500 0.5500 5.2200 0.0001 0.2234
GFG(IO) 1.6200 0.4400 3.6600 0.0026 0.1365
GCG(IO) 1.6900 0.3100 5.4800 0.0001 0.1418
ACOL(2) 4.3400 0.7800 5.6000 0.0001 0.3626
AFG(5) 1.4200 0.5900 2.3900 0.0314 0.0869
ACG(5) 1.5100 0.4800 3.1400 0.0073 0.1418
CSSCOL(l) 2.6500 0.4900 5.3800 0.0001 0.2172
CSSFG(4) 1.7100 0.5600 3.0800 0.0081 0.1896
CSSCG(5) 2.1600 0.2700 7.8300 0.0001 0.1834
INTELLIGENCE (X4 ) DATA:
OBS X4B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 1.3400 0.5200 2.5800 0.0220 0.1050
GFG(IO) 1.2600 0.4200 2.9800 0.0100 0.1061
GCG(IO) 0.5700 0.2900 1.9500 0.0711 0.0478
ACOL(2) 0.7600 0.7400 1.0300 0.3210 0.0635
AFG(5) 2.2900 0.5700 4.0500 0.0012 0.1401
ACG(5) 2.9600 0.4600 6.4400 0.0001 0.2779
CSSCOL(l) 1.3900 0.4700 2.6500 0.0106 0.1139
CSSFG(4) 0.3100 0.5300 0.5800 0.5690 0.0344
CSSCG(5) 1.6600 0.2600 6.2800 0.0001 0.1409
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COMMANDING OFFICER'S JUDGEMENT (X5) DATA:
OBS X5B SE T P WT
GCOL(4) 2.1700 0.5300 4.1100 0.0011 0.1701
GFG(IO) 4.1100 0.4300 9.6100 0.0001 0.3463
GCG(IO) 3.0600 0.3000 10.2500 0.0001 0.2567
ACOL(2) 2.4400 0.7500 3.2400 0.0059 0.2038
AFG(5) 5.6500 0.5800 9.800 0.0001 0.3456
ACG(5) 1.6100 0.4700 3.4500 0.0039 0.1512
CSSCOL(l) 2.3700 0.4600 4.9700 0.0002 0.1943
CSSFG(4) 2.0800 0.5400 5.7200 0.0001 0.3415
CSSCG(5) 2.6000 0.2700 9.7100 0.0001 0.2207
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E. COMPUTATION OF THE NORMALIZED WEIGHT VALUE
Since the above groups differ with respect to the size
2
of their R value, direct comparison of sets of beta (B)
coefficients between groups would not be meaningful.
Accordingly, a normalized weight value was computed for each
group (via Lotus 1,2,3) in order to compare one group to the
next.
What follows is an example of the formula used to
compute the "percent manning level" normalized weight value.
I will use the "colonel ground" sample group, with respect
to the survey's "personnel" model beta coefficient assess-
ment values. A like formula was used for each factor,
within each group.
XI = % ML
X2 = % CMOS
X3 = % > E-5
X4 = SEXP
ABS = Absolute Value
WT = X1/(ABSX1 + ABSX2 + ABSX3 + ABSX4)




GENERAL INFORMATION IN REGARDS TO EXPERT77
This appendix contains general informational documents
that pertain to the EXPERT77 software package referred to in
the text of this study.
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EXPERT77
DECISION SOFTWARE FOR MANAGERS AND SCIENTISTS
On January 1, 1986, MAGIC77 Software will release its
current version of EXPERT77 to a limited group of customers.
EXPERT77 is the first quasi-AI software tool capable of
single-session solutions for a broad spectrum of decision/
judgement/evaluation problems in a microcomputer
envi ronment
.
EXPERT77 is a tool for guiding you towards a better
understanding of either personal or organizational problems;
problems which typically require policy decisions. Many
areas of application, including investment policy,
purchasing decisions, personnel evaluation, compensation
systems, evaluation of department/division performance, and
many others.
EXPERT77 acquires the reliable component of a user's
intuitive knowledge and applies this knowledge objectively
and accurately (in EXPERT SYSTEM mode) to your data base or
to any individual problem.
For IBM PC / 128K and clones. Version 4.0 permits creation
of your own hierarchically structured data base.




ORGANIZATIONS EXIST FOR A PURPOSE.
OBJECTIVES ARE STATEMENTS OF PURPOSE AND DIRECTION,
FORMALIZED INTO A SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT.
THE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT RESIDES IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF PURPOSE.
A MEMBER'S BEHAVIOR IS GUIDED BY AN INTERNALIZED PERCEPTION
OF WHAT IS APPROPRIATE.
CONTINUITY OF EFFORT COMES FROM A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF
PURPOSE .
THIS SHARED UNDERSTANDING PROVIDES THE ORGANIZATIONAL MEM3ERS
WITH A FIRMER BASE FOR DEVELOPING AND INTEGRATING PLANS AND
PERSONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITY.
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WHAT IS ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS?
HOW WELL THE ORGANIZATION (SYSTEM) MEETS ITS GOALS.
IT IS AN ABSTRACTION WHICH CAN ONLY BE UNDERSTOOD BY
AGGREGATING THE VALUES AND PREFERENCES OF ORGANIZATION
MEMBERS
.
WHY IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
IMPORTANT?
WITHOUT A MEANINGFUL STATEMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS, CONTINUITY
OF EFFORT IS A CHANCE OCCURRENCE.
THE HALLMARKS OF ORGANIZATIONS SUGGEST THAT AN ORGANIZATION'S
RELATIONS WITH THE ENVIRONMENT ARE VERY COMPLEX AND
MULTIDIMENSIONAL .
THIS COMPLEXITY LEADS TO A KIND OF AMBIGUITY OF PURPOSE WHICH
PERVADES ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE TODAY.
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UNITED WE STAND AMD DIVIDED WE FALL: THE USE OF BOOTSTRAP IN
THE EXPLICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
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X-300TSTRAP
DEFINITION - A METHOD FOR EXPLICATING A HIERARCHICAL MODEL
OF ORGANIZATIONAL (SYSTEM) EFFECTIVENESS FROM ORGANIZATIONAL
"EXPERTS".
THE BASIC LOGIC IS AS FOLLOWS:
(1) TOTAL SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
IS A FUNCTION OF SUBSYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS.
(2) SUBSYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
IS A FUNCTION OF SUBSYSTEM OUTPUT.
(3) SUBSYSTEM OUTPUT
IS A FUNCTION OF SUBSYSTEM ELEMENTS AND
ATTRIBUTES
.
X-BOOTSTRAP ALSO EXPOSES A WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES, QUESTIONS
AND PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IF WE WISH TO DESIGN
ORGANIZATIONS THAT UNDERSTAND THEIR PURPOSE.
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ENGINEERING EFFECTIVENESS IS A FUNCTION OF







































PRODUCTIVITY IS A FUNTION OF:
RESULTS
RESOURCES
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO OF THIS TYPE REQUIRESINTERPRETATION OF A
AN UNDERSTANDING OF:
1) RESULTS,
2) THE DESIRED MIX OF RESULTS,
3) THE RESOURCES AND RESOURCE MIX, AND
4) THE RELATIONSHIP OF RESOURCES TO RESULTS
X-BOOTSTRAP
PRODUCTIVITY
CAN HELP AN ORGANIZATION DEVELOP MEANINGFUL
RATIOS FOR PLANNING AND CONTROL PURPOSES.
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AN ALTERNATE ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA
There are many ways to manipulate the data in Tables 7.2
to 7.7 for further analysis. One of these ways is presented
below.
In Tables 7.2 to 7.7 there appears to be significant
differences in the importance of the subdimensions across
each element and within each grade level. Yet, these
differences can be greatly modified by converting to
relative weights (versus normalized weights) across each
subdimension
.
In the data sets of relative weights below, the values
were computed by multiplying the normalized "major"
dimension weight times the normalized "subdimension" weight.
For example, with respect to the GND COL data, the
normalized weight of the major dimension "personnel", was
multiplied times the subdimension "percent manning level",
to obtain the relative weight. Like computations were
conducted for each subdimension factor, i.e.:
Overall Personnel (.45) x % Manning Level (.46) = .21
These relative weights may be useful in identifying the
relative importance of subdimensions across elements and
175
grade levels, thus reducing any aggregation issues that may
arise in interpretation of the results in subject tables.
Personnel Model Values:
Ground : COL FG CG
% ML .21 .10 .05
SEXP .12 .04 .04
CMOS .07 .04 .03
> E5 .05 .04 .04
Air :
% ML .14 .07 .07
SEXP .03 .05 .05
CMOS .07 .03 .06
> E5 .05 .06 .03
CSS :
% ML .11 .11 .13
SEXP .05 .04 .04
CMOS .20 .07 .07
> E5 .07 .04 .07
Equipment and Supplies Model Values:
Ground : COL * FG CG
% Equip .11 .10 .08
% Supplies .08 .06 .07
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Ai r
% Equip .08 .08
% Supplies .08 .04
CSS:
% Equip .13 .11
% Supplies .06 .06





% Equip .08 .09





















































































Morale .04 .06 .03
C3 .09 .02 .02































By using a Lotus 1,2,3 type of spreadsheet package, a
myriad of graphs (pie, bar, line, etc.) could be developed
to present the above results. Yet, without the ability to
print them in color much of the graphics effect is lost.
Accordingly, no graphics were prepared for this study.
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